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Personal and societal alienation in the 20th century 
means that we as social beings, conditioned now by the values 
of utilitarianism rather than those of the spirit, experience 
profound anxiety and insecurity about our lives. Lacking 
general individual access, as potential social critics, to 
the expressive media, we experience life not as pleasure but 
increasingly as the frustration of a steady process of 
dehumanization. It is the purpose of the present research 
to assess the problem of alienation with respect to its 
significance for education and to investigate the possible 
wider vision that one style of educational reconceptualiza-
tion might suggest. 
The method integrates the perspectives of three studies: 
religion, myth, and education theory. Drawing on the work 
of Jung, Neumann, Eliade, Campbell, Brueggemann, and others, 
the discussion is qualitative and hermeneutic, rather than 
quantitative or statistical, to the extent that it rests on 
a series of theoretical constructs and then attempts, not a 
conflaition, but an assimilation of those generalizations out 
of related but unconnected disciplines into the new language 
of a proposed alternative view of the meaning and purpose of 
education in and for our culture. 
This dialectic leads to the conclusion that mythic 
discourse, because of its unique capacity to establish 
connections across broad contextual gulfs, can ultimately 
reconcile, within a pedagogy that embraces language and 
vision, the characteristic alienation, fragmentation, and 
oppression of our lives—these will of course not simply go 
away, nor can we will them to do so—with the latent univer­
sal power of the race to exist both creatively and holis-
tically. The perspective that myth suggests for the educa­
tion dialogue lies in the basic bond between the spiritual 
and the political/moral universes. It is a viewpoint that 
lets us hold a conversation about education which is itself 
deeply concerned with the politics of spirituality and which 
can draw meaningful inferences regarding the uses of myth 
for the living. 
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A superstructure of theory is always transitory, being 
constantly superseded by fresh theories which make nearer 
and nearer approaches to the truth without ever reaching 
it. On the shore of the great ocean of reality men are 
perpetually building theoretical castles of sand, which are 
perpetually being washed away by the rising tide of know­
ledge. I cannot expect my own speculations to be more lasting 
than those of my predecessors. The most that a speculative 
thinker can hope for is to be remembered for a time as one 
of the long line of runners, growing dimmer and dimmer as 
they recede in the distance, who have striven to hand on 
the torch of knowledge with its little circle of light glim­
mering in the illimitable darkness of the unknown. (From 
Creation and Evolution in Primitive Cosmogonies, p. viii, 
by J. G. Frazer, 1935.) 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CRISIS IN EDUCATION: CRITIQUE AND RESPONSE 
The problem of alienation, especially as it plays itself 
out in our personal and social lives, has been widely dis­
cussed by 20th century cultural critics. Critics from 
varying perspectives and academic disciplines have written 
profusely about alienation throughout the last 25 years. 
In 1964 Jacques Ellul, a French sociologist, wrote in The 
Technological Society about the advent of technology as an 
alienating phenomenon. In the book Ellul discussed how our 
human activities were going through the process, first of 
being technicized, next of being rendered efficient, finally 
of suffering diminution. He described our society as one 
in which the overriding value of usefulness, rather than 
goodness, caused persons to experience powerlessness and 
thus to feel anxious and insecure about their lives. Living 
in a society whose ordinary citizens have little in the way 
of individual access to the expressive media for the pur­
poses of social criticism, persons experience a life that 
is not characterized by happiness but rather by progressive 
dehumanization. Ellul writes: 
[Humankind] is also completely despoiled of everything 
that traditionally constituted his essence. Man 
becomes a pure appearance, a kaleidoscope of external 
shapes, an abstraction in a milieu that is frighteningly 
concrete—an abstraction armed with all the sovereign 
signs of Jupiter the Thunderer. (p. 432) 
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To this frightening description of humankind R. D. Laing 
(1967), a British psychiatrist, added, in The Politics of 
Experience, that with respect to social normalcy, 
No one can begin to think, feel or act now except from 
the starting point of his or her own alienation . . . 
which goes to the roots. The realization of this is 
the essential springboard for any serious reflection 
on any aspect of present interhuman life. (p. 12) 
Laing goes on to postulate that society "highly values its 
normal man" (p. 28) whose condition is described thus: "The 
condition of alienation, of being asleep, of being uncon­
scious, of being out of one's mind, is the condition of the 
normal man" (p. 28). 
Theologians comment on alienation, too. Harvey Cox 
(1969), author of the earlier The Secular City, wrote in 
The Feast of Fools that "mankind has paid a frightful price 
for the present opulence of Western industrial society" 
(p. 7). Cox discusses the ramifications of acquisitiveness 
thus: 
Part of the price [for this opulence] is exacted daily 
from the poor nations of the world whose fields and 
forests garnish our tables while we push their people 
further into poverty. Part is paid by the plundered 
poor who dwell within the gates of the rich nations 
without sharing in the plenty. But part of the price 
has been paid by affluent Western man himself. . . . 
While gaining the whole world he has been losing his own 
soul. He has purchased prosperity at the cost of a 
staggering impoverishment of the vital elements of his 
life [emphasis added]. These elements are festivity— 
the capacity for genuine revelry and joyous celebration, 
and fantasy—the faculty for envisioning radically 
alternative life situations. (p. 7) 
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So while the psychiatrist wrote about the alienated mind, 
the theologian wrote about the alienated soul. 
Sociologist Philip Slater wrote the national bestseller 
The Pursuit of Loneliness; American Culture at the Breaking 
Point in 1970; he revised it in 1976 in order to speak "less 
about what happens to people than about what people do—to 
themselves, to each other" (p. xiv). Among the many topics 
Slater discusses is the idea of getting involved in solving 
the social problems which confront us. Slater contends that 
we are so removed from the problems themselves and from the 
type of thinking that envisions connections that 
We are, as a people, perturbed by our inability to 
anticipate the consequences of our acts, but we still 
wait optimistically for some magic telegram, informing 
us that the tangled skein of misery and self-deception 
into which we have woven ourselves has vanished in the 
night. (p. 19) 
Slater goes on to say that "when social problems persist (as 
they always do), those who call attention to their continued 
presence are accused of 'going too far' and 'causing the pen­
dulum to swing the other way'" (p. 20). Thus social pressure 
perpetuates social problems. 
Historian Theodore Roszak, who wrote The Making of a 
Counter Culture; Reflections on the Technocratic Society 
and Its Youthful Opposition in 1968, and later published 
Where the Wasteland Ends; Politics and Transcendence in 
Postindustrial Society in 1972, calls for a reliance on that 
visionary experience which can prevent the diminution of our 
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very existence in the realms of human creativity and commu­
nity. Roszak (1968) believes that it is through a focus on 
the question of how to live rather than through a question of 
what we shall know that we can prevent our annihilation. 
Elsewhere Roszak (1972) sees the ecological problems we face 
as the "outward mirror of our inner condition" and proposes 
that 
We can now recognize that the fate of the soul is the 
fate of the social order: that if the spirit within 
us withers, so too will all the world we build about 
us. (p. xvii) 
In Wasteland Roszak (1972) sees hope in "religious renewal" 
and those who speak for it. 
Another critic who has written about the individual 
alienated by culture is Christopher Lasch, author of The 
Culture of Narcissism; American Life in an Age of Diminish­
ing Expectations and the subsequent The Minimal Self; Psychic 
Survival in Troubled Times. Lasch (1979) wrote about the 
narcissistic society as one "that gives increasing prominence 
and encouragement to narcissistic traits" and as one in 
which the "narcissist has no interest in the future because, 
in part, he has so little interest in the past" (p. 23). 
Lasch describes the culture of such a society as one in 
which the past is trivialized while it is made marketable; 
one in which the devaluation of the past reflects "not only 
the poverty of the prevailing ideologies, which have lost 
their grip on reality and abandoned the attempt to master it, 
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but the poverty of the narcissist's inner life" (p. 23). In 
addition to being alienated from the past, from our inner 
lives, we are alienated from our own experience, and, accord­
ing to Lasch, we expect "experts to define our needs for us 
and then [we] wonder why those needs never seem to be satis­
fied" (p. 25). Perhaps the most telling characteristic of 
our society appears in the context of our "denial of the 
past, superficially progressive and optimistic, [which] 
proves on closer analysis to embody the despair of a society 
that cannot face the future" (p. 26). 
In the later work Lasch (1984) carries this argument 
even further by describing everyday life as "an exercise in 
survival" (p. 15). People, according to Lasch, 
Take one day at a time . . . [and] seldom look back, 
lest they succumb to a debilitating "nostalgia"; and 
if they look ahead, it is to see how they can insure 
themselves against the disasters almost everybody now 
expects. (p. 15) 
In a discussion of selfhood, Lasch proposes that selfhood 
becomes 
A kind of luxury, out of place in an age of impending 
austerity.' Selfhood implies a personal history, friends, 
family, a sense of place. Under siege, the self con­
tracts to a defensive core, armed against adversity. 
Emotional equilibrium demands a minimal self, not the 
imperial self of yesteryear. (p. 15) 
Lasch sees the fragmentation in the social order as so great 
that the hope that political action could 
gradually humanize industrial society has given way to 
a determination to survive the general wreckage or, 
more modestly, to hold one's own life together in the 
face of mounting pressures. (p. 16) 
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Lasch further argues that "the danger of personal disinte­
gration encourages a sense of selfhood neither 'imperial' 
nor 'narcissistic* but simply beleaguered" (p. 16). Elo­
quently, Lasch declares: 
The achievement of selfhood, which our culture makes 
so difficult, might be defined as the acknowledgment 
of our separation from the original source of life, 
combined with a continuing struggle to recapture a sense 
of primal union by means of activity that gives us a 
provisional understanding and mastery of the world with­
out denying our limitations and dependency. Selfhood is 
the painful awareness of the tension between our unlim­
ited aspirations and our limited understanding, between 
our original intimations of immortality and our fallen 
state, between oneness and separation. A new culture— 
a postindustrial culture, if you like—has to be based 
on a recognition of these contradictions in human expe­
rience, not on a technology that tries to restore the 
illusion of self-sufficiency or, on the other hand, on 
a radical denial of selfhood that tries to restore the 
illusion of absolute unity with nature. (p. 20) 
Jonathan Schell (1982) in The Fate of the Earth agrees 
with Lasch that by alienating ourselves from our past we are 
foregoing our chances for a future. Writing with nuclear 
extinction in mind, Schell thinks we will determine to live 
our lives rather than destroy them only if we begin to rea­
lize our connections with the generations that have come 
before us and to the generations that will follow. 
Critics of the sixties and seventies later found their 
expectations of the end of the century to be so different 
from the realities they encountered that they wrote books 
about their new observations and humankind's response to 
them. Harvey Cox (1984), for example, found the postmodern 
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society to be at such variance from what anyone had expected 
that he wrote Religion in the Secular City; Toward a Post­
modern Theology in order to examine the religion of the new 
order and describe what he found to be the promising rise of 
theologically viable groups equipped with the ability to work 
for survival and community in the new era. The resources for 
a postmodern theology will, according to Cox, 
come from those sectors of the modern social edifice 
that for various reasons—usually to do with class or 
color or gender—have been consigned to its lower 
stories and excluded from the chance to help formulate 
its religious vision. They will come from those parts 
of the world geopoliticians classify as the "periphery," 
regions also largely left out of participation in the 
centers of modern theological discourse which are located 
in the Western political and cultural milieu. (p. 21) 
Cox, then, relies on those who have been oppressed under our 
previous social structures for guidance in the next age. 
Issues of gender and alienation also have been explored 
in depth in the literature of the last 25 years. One book 
instrumental in describing the reasons for—and characteris­
tics of—this kind of alienation and fragmentation was In a 
Different Voice; Psychological Theory and Women's Develop­
ment by Carol Gilligan of Harvard. Gilligan (1982) exposed 
the fact that almost all developmental research at many insti­
tutions of higher education had been based exclusively on 
male samples but that the conclusions from these studies had 
been published as generic ones. Because of such research 
biases, Gilligan says that women have been developmentally 
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misunderstood and as a result also have felt alienated from 
their own experiences. In her own resulting research, Gilli-
gan concludes that women become, not morally deficient—as 
was once believed—in comparison to men, but morally differ­
ent . In a culture pervaded with maleness, Gilligan con­
cludes : 
As we have listened for centuries to the voices of men 
and the theories of development that their experience 
informs, so we have come more recently to notice not 
only the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing 
what they say when they speak. Yet in the different 
voice of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the 
tie between relationship and responsibility. ... By 
positing instead two different modes, we arrive at a 
more complex rendition of human experience which sees 
the truth of separation and attachment in the lives of 
women and men and recognizes how these truths are car­
ried by different modes of language and thought, 
(pp. 173-174) 
Gilligan espouses the notion that the "dialogue between fair­
ness and care not only provides a better understanding of 
relations between the sexes but also gives rise to a more 
comprehensive portrayal of adult work and family relation­
ships" (p. 174) . 
The above discussions of alienation are only a few of 
those of significance that have appeared in the past 25 years. 
These writers point out that we are concerned about whole­
ness and about living fully human lives as persons existing • 
in a world which is a mirror of our own malaise. In effect 
we are faced with alienation on all levels of our existence— 
from the Creator, from the natural creation, from humankind, 
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and from our own inner lives. Superadded to this sense of 
alienation is the feeling of powerlessness to do anything 
about the existing human condition. 
Any phenomenon capable of producing so powerful an 
effect on the culture at large alike affects education. And 
it is the responsibility of the educator to be aware of not 
only the phenomenon but its effects on the whole institution 
of education. As James B. Macdonald wrote (1975): 
It is clear to me now that when we speak of education 
we speak in the context of a microscopic paradigm of 
a macroscopic human condition, a paradigm that holds 
all of the complexities in microcosm of the larger 
condition. (p. 4) 
Recognizing that education is principally characterized 
by the culture at large, educational theorists have responded 
to the phenomenon of alienation as it has played itself out 
in various facets of educational thought. Responding to the 
phenomenon of alienation and fragmentation as it appears in 
curriculum are the critical theorists who, according to Henry 
Giroux (1981) in "Toward a New Sociology of Curriculum," are 
united by a single theme—opposition to the "technocratic 
rationality that guides traditional curriculum theory and 
design" (p. 99). The responses of these theorists are varied 
and arise from training in a variety of disciplines. 
Mainly out of the social and political perspectives of 
Henry Giroux and Paulo Freire, the topic of alienation as 
oppression has moved into educational discourse. According 
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to Giroux (1981) , traditional curriculum—or, as he terms 
it, the technocratic model of curriculum—has been "crit­
icized both for its stated claims to the truth and the assump­
tions implicit in the kinds of questions it ignores" (p. 100). 
Among Giroux's criticisms of the traditional curriculum are 
that it "ignores its ethical function . . . [and] is also 
stripped of its political function" (p. 101); that it appears 
to place high priority on control, where the "subjective 
dimension of knowing is lost . . . [and] the purpose of know­
ledge becomes one of accumulation and categorization" 
(p. 101); that it espouses objectivity and valuelessness; 
and that it represents a "firm commitment to a view of 
rationality that is ahistorical" (p. 102) . To fight the kind 
of alienation and powerlessness the traditional curriculum 
breeds, Giroux proposes that a new curriculum theory needs 
to be formed built on those questions which accept that 
"power, knowledge, ideology and schooling are linked in ever-
changing patterns of complexity" (p. 104). 
In another work, Theory and Resistance in Education: 
A Pedagogy for the Opposition, Giroux (1983) discusses ways 
in which this "radical pedagogy" might become less alienat­
ing—and more empowering—by enlisting the responses of 
"working-class people, minorities of color, and women" 
(p. 238) and encouraging them to become actively involved in 
the shaping of school policies and experiences. Once these 
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groups become involved, according to Giroux, they can "become 
the subject[s] of such policy making . . . rather than . . . 
the object[s]" (p. 238). 
In a more recent turn in his scholarship, Giroux (1987) 
broached the subject of language and empowerment. In Lit­
eracy, Voice, and the Pedagogy of Political Empowerment, 
Giroux (1987), calling on the scholarship of Antonio Gramsci, 
proposes that literacy may "have less to do with the task of 
teaching people how to read and write than with producing and 
legitimating oppressive and exploitative social relations" 
(p. 1). Here literacy is presented as a "double-edged 
sword"—"wielded for the purpose of self and social empower­
ment or for the perpetuation of relations of repression and 
domination" (p. 1). Critical literacy then has to be fought 
for as an "ideological construct and as a social movement" 
(p. 1). Giroux writes that literacy has 
to be viewed as a social construction that is always 
implicated in organizing one's view of history, the 
present and the future; furthermore, the notion of 
literacy need[s] to be grounded in an ethical and 
political project that dignif[ies] and extend[s] the 
possibilities for human life and freedom. In other 
words, literacy as a radical construct ha[s] to be rooted 
in a spirit of critique and project of possibility that 
enable[s] people to participate in the understanding 
and transformation of their society. (p. 2) 
Giroux has approached political and social alienation in 
the educational setting and called for a critical assessment 
of what we do in schools as well as of the language that 
dominates us. He also proposes that we find ways of 
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empowering those who, in both the social structure and the 
school structure, have no power. 
A contributor to Giroux's argument is Paulo Freire 
(1970), who in Pedagogy of the Oppressed proposed a means 
of empowering the illiterate and impoverished people of 
Third World countries through interpersonal dialogical 
encounters in which the focus of the discussion was on 
description of the world followed by receipt of the proper 
tools for perceiving personal and social position and dealing 
critically with it. Drawing on the thoughts of Martin Buber, 
Freire (1970) describes the dialogical theory of action, in 
which "Subjects meet in cooperation in order to transform 
the world" (p. 167) . There is no domination; "Instead, there 
are Subjects who meet to name the world in order to transform 
it" (p. 167). 
Calling on language and community as political tools, 
Freire (1970) conceptualizes a world where social change is 
brought about through the eventual cooperation of the orig­
inal oppressors with the subjects. Such an educational 
theory is a:a assault on alienation at the political and per­
sonal levels. 
Maxine Greene (1978), in Landscapes of Learning, writes 
from the perspective of the existentialist concerned with 
aesthetics and society. She calls our attention to the role 
of education in a world whose people "once had faith in 
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social activism and commitment [but] have withdrawn from the 
social arena into their own problematic privacy" (p. 1). 
Greene treats alienation as the opposite of "emancipation 
and 'wide-awakeness'11 (p. 2) and calls on the humanities, 
especially the study of literature, for the skills needed to 
bring about personal transcendence of the present social 
situation and of the resultant passivity. Greene feels that 
a study of literature can help people understand their own 
"landscapes"—"their lived lives" as persons in a particular 
historical and social situation (p. 2). 
Greene (1978) writes about education as discovering 
connections and as learning in community. Learning, she 
says, 
is, in one dimension, a conscious search for some kind 
of coherence, some kind of sense. Learning also is a 
process of effecting new connections in experience, of 
thematizing, problematizing, and imposing diverse pat­
terns on the inchoateness of things. (p. 3) 
Asserting that "we all learn to become human . . . within a 
community of some kind [emphasis added]" (p. 3), Greene pro­
poses that the activities 
that compose learning not only engage us in our own 
quests for answers and for meanings; they also serve to 
initiate us into the . . . human community, in its 
largest and richest sense. (p. 3) 
She warns that "teachers who are alienated, passive, and 
unquestioning cannot make such initiations possible for those 
around" them and that "teachers who take the social real-
it [ies] surrounding them for granted and simply accede to 
them" (p. 3) cannot coax students into "wide-awakeness." 
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Greene maintains that the experience with literature is 
an accessible opportunity for teachers wishing to promote 
dialogue about our own histories and lost spontaneity. It is 
through a study of literature that Greene sees the possibil­
ity for empowering the alienated. On the uses of literature 
she writes: 
One of the strengths of imaginative literature is that 
it can enable women [and men] to assume new standpoints 
on what they take for granted, to animate certain con­
structs with their indignation, so that they can see 
them as sources of the injustice that plagues them, see 
them, not as givens, but as constituted by human beings 
and changeable by human beings. The imaginative leap 
can lead to the leap that is praxis, the effort to 
remake and transcend. (p. 223) 
Greene thinks there is hope for a world changed by education— 
one that grounds persons in their own histories and focuses 
on energetically lived lives (those characterized by "wide-
awakeness"); one where people can act on possibilities for 
emancipation. 
Other educational theorists respond in like ways to 
the radiant personal and cultural problems connected with 
alienation as it plays itself out in education. William 
Pinar, from the psychoanalytic perspective, for example, 
suggests the use of currere as a means of getting at the 
inner experience of the public (see 1975a, p. 399; 1976, 
pp. vii-viii) and called for a method at once regressive, 
progressive, analytic, synthetic, and that "places this inte­
grated understanding of individual experience into the larger 
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political and cultural web, explaining the dialectical rela­
tion between the two" (1975b, p. 424). 
Similarly, Madeleine Grumet (1981), in "Autobiography 
and Reconceptualization," writes about the use of autobiog­
raphy as a method of curriculum research—one that concretely 
details an individual's experience with the curriculum in an 
effort to transform that experience into a useful background 
for more recent choices about the uses of power (p. 141). 
Grumet sees this research method as a means of living cur­
riculum: 
Curriculum is the child of culture, and their relation 
is as complex and reciprocal as are any that bond the 
generations. Curriculum transmits culture, as it is 
formed by it. Curriculum modifies culture, even as it 
transmits it. Similarly, as with culture, we live cur­
riculum before we describe it. (p. 140) 
But it is in the describing that we live it again, more 
aware now of the constructs of our choices. Grumet further 
points out that the autobiographical method provides informa­
tion even in the choosing of recalled events because "the 
possibility that schools may become places where students 
understand their own powers is never realized through rhet­
oric but through the choices and actions that fill the min­
utes we spend together" (p. 143). 
While these and other similar educational theorists 
provide valuable criticisms of the state of education and 
insights into the problems of personal and cultural aliena­
tion, I find them lacking in their failure to recognize the 
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profundity of the cultural, personal, and educational prob­
lems. Appropriate responses to our current cultural and 
educational crises call for far-reaching and informed visions 
regarding resolutions. It is true that what we do in educa­
tion must be reconceptualized; it is also true that this 
reconceptualization requires a much wider vision than any of 
the above educational theorists proposes. 
It is my contention that we are choosing whether or not 
to live as people on a planet for which we are responsible, 
but for which we are refusing to take responsibility. Never 
before in our history have we been capable of annihilation of 
the entire earth and never before have we faced such forces 
of alienation as those created by our technological society. 
Alienation of this sort requires a new vision of life, and of 
the ways of communicating with everyone about the living of 
that life. 
Two educational theorists—Dwayne Huebner and David 
Purpel—get at these issues on a much broader scale than 
that discussed above and set the stage for the kind of edu­
cational discourse proposed in this paper. What has been 
offered above is a colloquy of powerful arguments for fight­
ing alienation and empowering persons both personally and 
politically. What is missing is a foundation for discourse 
which can bring these arguments to a common ground encompass­
ing the various concerns expressed. We are dealing with 
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political problems; we are dealing with existential problems 
for living; we are dealing with psychoanalytical problems. 
But we are also dealing with a crisis much larger than any 
one of these arguments, and the vision of a means of communi­
cating about these problems must be much greater still. 
Dwayne Huebner (1984) in "The Search for Religious 
Metaphors in the Language of Education" expresses concern 
for more "adequate and powerful ways to describe education 
. . . critically and creatively" (p. 112). Huebner cites 
Whitehead's statement that the "essence of education is that 
it be religious" and that education must be characterized by 
duty and reverence. By "duty" Huebner feels that Whitehead 
means a "response to, indeed a response-ability for, the 
earth . . . and those of us . . . who people it" (p. 114). 
By "reverence" Huebner believes Whitehead is referring to 
the "perception that the present holds within itself . . . 
eternity" (p. 114). So for education to be both reverent and 
dutiful, it must lay claim to the power to instruct us in 
going beyond ourselves to care for the world and the "others" 
with whom we come in contact. Huebner writes about the 
results of an education which takes place in community this 
way: 
If we recognize that education is a response to the 
otherness of the world, that the stranger of the world 
will not destroy us if. we meet him or her in the recon­
ciling communities of care and love, and if we see in 
the structure of knowledge the manifestation of otherness 
and love; then perhaps we can be more certain that 
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Caesar will get only his share. These difficult tasks 
are easier if they occur among people who participate 
in communities of faith, no matter what their specific 
tradition. (p. 123) 
Huebner, then, imbues the profundity of the purposes of edu­
cation with the characteristics of reverence (for the past, 
present, and future of our existence) and responsibility for 
the created order of the world, including the natural environ­
ment and other persons. 
David Purpel also writes about moral and religious frame­
works for education, and in addition proposes a role for the 
educator as a creator and critic of visions about ways to 
deal with the present cultural and educational crises. In 
his forthcoming book, The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Edu­
cation: A Curriculum for Social Justice and Compassion 
(1988), he asserts that "education is at root a moral 
endeavor"; that is, it is an endeavor which "focuses on 
principles, rules, and ideas that are related to human rela­
tionships . . . with each other and with the world" (p. 104). 
Responding to alienation as it is revealed in "contradictions 
and confusions over our basic values marked by self-deception 
and self-destructiveness," Purpel argues that 
the cultural and educational crises are rooted in . . . 
moral ambiguities and confusions, and . . . that these 
moral difficulties emerge from our inability to deal 
with the even broader and deeper religious or metaphysi­
cal bases of moral, political, and social policies, 
(p. 108) 
Purpel believes that our crises are a result of 
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our failure to develop an over-arching mythos of mean­
ing, purpose, and ultimacy that can guide us in the 
creation of a vision of the good, true, and beautiful 
life and in the work that this vision creates for us. 
(p. 108) 
So for the educator Purpel prescribes the role of partici­
pant in 
the process of creating that vision as part of our 
responsibility—a responsibility which coincides with 
our vital need for such a vision to provide directions 
for our professional activities. 
As educators, our responsibilities, however, are 
not simply to promulgate visions but to inquire into 
them—not just to study them but to be critical and 
discerning of them—to be contributor, critic, and 
celebrator. (p. 108) 
Purpel further believes that we have the ability to create 
not just individual visions but a consensus about a model of 
"ultimate meaning—some way of conceptualizing a response" 
to questions of origin, identity, and purpose (p. 110). As 
a part of this envisioning of crises and solutions, Purpel 
says that we should both call upon existing myths which 
help us connect our lives in the everyday world to a 
cosmology : . . and recognize the strength and persis­
tence of this ancient, continuous and on-going impulse 
to create meaning systems that give order and direction 
to our lives. (p. Ill) 
It is in the continuum of the discourse on religion, rev­
erence, and duty offered by Huebner and Purpel that this paper 
is written. 
What is offered in this paper is in a sense a religious 
discussion to the extent that it both recognizes the exis­
tence of a power larger than ourselves and recognizes our 
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connection to this power as an inward and outward expression 
of identity. In this paper, however, this particular phenom­
enon is only part of a discourse on the implications of myth 
for education. I believe that mythic discourse has the abil­
ity to connect the past and the present, the personal and 
the social, the religious and the political in an attempt to 
draw all these dialectics together. And yet I believe that 
a discourse on myth has the ability to offer another dimen­
sion—both in language and in vision—concerned with a peda­
gogy that resists alienation, fragmentation, and oppression 
and, at the same time, empowers people in the depths of their 
beings for more creative and holistic lives. Myth offers a 
perspective for educational discourse: one that reveals the 
interconnectedness of the spiritual and political/moral 
dimensions of existence and enables us to engage in a dialogue 
on education that is itself about the politics of spiritual­
ity and the implications of this mythic phenomenon for 
living. 
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CHAPTER II 
EDUCATION DISCOURSE, MYTH AND ULTIMATE CONCERN 
The Problem of Language and Alienation 
In Habits of the Heart, Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swid-
ler, and Tipton (1985) write about conversations with many 
Americans concerning their struggles to develop a sense of 
individuality and at the same time maintain a commitment to 
the larger society. The authors find that Americans are 
deeply concerned about families, communities, the right way 
to live, what to teach children, public and private responsi­
bility. It is quite significant, though, that while most of 
the persons interviewed spoke openly about individual goals 
and desires, they preferred to keep their concern about 
morality and community "relegated to the realm of private 
anxiety, as if it would be awkward or embarrassing to make 
it public" (p. vii). 
Inasmuch as schools mirror the larger society, they 
also reflect this anxiety about discussions with respect to 
living moral and communal lives. It has become increasingly 
uncomfortable in the public schools—as in society in gen­
eral—to air one's innermost thoughts and concerns, espe­
cially when these expressions run counter to what the larger 
society dictates as important, significant, and proper for 
public discourse. In addition, there is a great deal of 
self-consciousness in a culture which puts emphasis on image. 
The worst result, however, is that the anxiety over discus­
sions on important issues has contributed to a lack of lan­
guage—and, consequently, a lack of desire to create lan­
guage—for discussions about the aspects of life which concern 
us at the deepest levels. Language is the key to communica­
tion and without proper words and concepts to express our 
deepest thoughts and ideas, our discourse is deprived of 
entire areas of concern. The danger is, of course, that our 
lives are in danger of becoming shaped and controlled only 
by those concepts and ideas about which we can communicate. 
If we lack language about those concepts and concerns most 
significant to us, then our lives become shaped and con­
trolled by ideas, concepts, and concerns of lesser impor­
tance . 
One of the purposes of this paper is to suggest a lan­
guage which can move educational discourse beyond the private 
realm to the public while, at the same time, maintaining the 
gravity of our private discourse. I believe that it is pos­
sible to find a lexicon which can maintain the significance 
of the issues and simultaneously provide language for public 
debate. Because the subject at hand is of ultimate impor­
tance to our survival as persons, as a society and as a 
world, the language must be one which can indicate the weight 
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and the far-reaching significance of the subject. It must 
be a language of depth, which can work as metaphor—which 
can call up our deepest knowledge about what it means to be 
fully human, which can act to preserve a world on the verge 
of extinction by our own hands. It must be a language that 
can call up what is most sacred, for preservation of life 
and of the earth is surely a sacred subject. 
Mythic Language and Ultimate Concern 
I find the language of myth to be profound and reverent 
and, at the same time, powerful enough to provide a proper 
framework for sacred discourse. Myth provides a language 
which can, on many levels, serve as metaphor to call up those 
concerns which are sacred. The study of myth is the study 
of the meaning of life—of how one should live in the world: 
as a functioning individual who must be psychologically 
whole, as a social being who must make a contribution to 
community and to the larger society, as a person in awe of 
the divine, as a person responsible for the natural world 
in which we all must live. I believe that at the deepest 
level we as human beings know, both collectively and indi­
vidually, that to live productive lives we must live in posi­
tive connection with all facets of the creation. I also 
believe that at the deepest level we know that we do not 
and indeed cannot function alone, making our way in the 
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world, independent of these essential relationships. What 
the discourse of myth provides, then, is conversation about 
ultimate concern—about what it is that gives us these basic 
connections to life at its most sacred roots and what all of 
this means for the way we live our lives. 
I have borrowed the term ultimate concern from Paul 
Tillich (1952, 1957), characterized as the most influential 
theologian of this century. Tillich spent his life fighting, 
through his theological writings, authoritarian systems that 
he saw as stultifying the life of the individual. Tillich 
begins his theological system with the human predicament 
or "situation" and talks about the ground of being as the 
object of ultimate concern. Tillich propounds a theological 
system and a view of the world in which the individual in 
community is forced to think about what it means to be free 
in a social context, to express ideas, to disagree with the 
government, and to act on the question of ultimate concern, 
which Tillich sees as having true authority over one's life. 
In one autobiographical essay, Tillich (1961) in writing 
about his preaching says that the contact with the audience 
"gives me a pervasive sense of joy, the joy of a creative 
communion, of giving and taking, even if the audience is 
not vocal" (p. 15). 
Attuned to discourse with others, Tillich found the 
source of this "creative communion" in his concept of 
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ultimate concern. Like myth, Tillich's theology provides 
a context—a language—for talking about matters of ultimate 
concern. It should be noted, however, that the language 
of Tillich's theology does not hold the potentiality of rich­
ness as does the language of myth. This seems to be primar­
ily because theological language tends to be conceptual while 
mythic language leans toward the metaphorical. 
In Dynamics of Faith, Tillich (1957) speaks about ulti­
mate concern with respect to love, faith, community, action, 
ritual and symbol, and about the "Ground of all Being"— 
the ultimate and unconditional—that precedes our minds and 
all created things. Tillich begins his writings with the 
assertion that faith and, - ndirectly, religion are of ulti­
mate concern. Religion and faith and ultimate concern, then, 
represent a movement toward the ultimate (or unconditional), 
which is similar to our usual concept of God but which can­
not be defined as such because of the limiting nature of 
defining God. Tillich believes that God cannot be defined 
because a definition would limit God's existence as the 
"ground," the thing behind all things. Tillich, then, pre­
fers to use "ground of being" or "Being-Itself" so that 
persons reading his theology will not equate his concept 
of the ultimate, which is beyond our comprehension, with 
the more limiting concept of God. 
A major component of our predicament as modern men, 
according to Tillich, is estrangement from this ground or 
foundation of our being. Since Tillich believes that "one 
is ultimately concerned only about something to which one 
essentially belongs and from which one is essentially sep­
arated" (p. 112), he believes that we experience anxiety 
because we, as finite creatures, are separated from the 
infinite. Tillich proposes a way to combat this anxiety and 
separation. He describes love, "the drive toward the reunion 
of the separated" (p. 112), as having the role of overcoming 
separation and anxiety and of bringing us into communion 
with the ultimate or ground of our being. Further, Tillich 
believes that ultimate concern "presupposes the reunion of 
the separated" (p. 112) and consequently that the "reunion 
[emphasis added] with that to which one belongs and from 
which one is estranged" (p. 112) is both "the concern of 
faith and the desire of love" (p. 112) . . In this context 
Tillich sees love as an element of faith since "faith is 
understood as ultimate concern" (p. 115). 
Having this reuniting or connective quality, love 
operates in Tillich's theology on another level. Since the 
object of one's faith or ultimate concern is the Ultimate 
or ground of being, and since faith claims love as its mani­
festation, love determines how one acts on one's faith. 
According to Tillich, love is the "mediating link between 
faith and works" (p. 115) . He writes: 
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Faith implies love, love lives in works: in this 
sense faith is actual in works. Where there is ulti­
mate concern there is the passionate desire to actual­
ize the content of one's concern. "Concern" in its 
very definition includes the desire for action, 
(pp. 115-116) 
The action one takes in behalf of this faith and love is action 
within community. Since faith to Tillich is a matter of 
community, "the state of ultimate concern is actual only 
within a community of action" (p. 117) . To Tillich a commu­
nity of action is also a community of faith, and the life 
of faith is life in a community of faith, "not only in its 
communal activities and institutions but also in the inner 
life of its members" (p. 118) . For Tillich there is no com­
munity without faith. 
Tillich writes that the faith of community is renewed 
through its mythic and cultic symbols and that myth,. 
if interpreted as the symbolic expression of ultimate 
concern, is the fundamental creation of every religious 
community. . . . Without the community in which they 
[cult and myth] are used, faith would disappear and 
man's ultimate concern would go into hiding. (p. 121) 
Not only is it important that a community have its mythic 
symbols, it must understand the symbolic character of its 
symbols or the nature of the community will be destroyed. 
Myth, then, is the language of ultimate concern but is valid 
only when it contains the richness of the ultimate concern 
itself, that is, when it can be interpreted and not taken 
literally. 
Tillich's concept of ultimate concern provides the 
initial insight for the mythic framework proposed in this 
study. Both Tillich's theology and myth focus on the impor­
tance of connections to the creative power of the universe,. 
Being-Itself. Both stress the necessity of such connections 
with the "ground" or "foundation" of one's being as determi­
nant of one's actions within community. And, indeed, both 
Tillich's theology and the mythic framework developed here 
hold that these connections are sacred by nature. Tillich 
also stresses the essential nature of mythic and symbolic 
language for the definition and preservation of community. 
That essentiality is a major assertion of this paper. 
Myth as Metaphor 
While Tillich's concept of ultimate concern hints at 
the nature of the mythic framework presented here, it does 
lack the richness the language of myth can provide. In Meta­
phorical Theology, Sallie McFague (1982) provides, in her 
discussion of metaphor, model, and concept, a framework to 
aid in moving from Tillich's theology to further discussion 
of the framework of mythic language. Quoting John Middleton 
Murry—"Metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself, and speech 
as ultimate as thought" (p. 32)—McFague determines metaphor 
to be the primary source of our language and knowledge because 
it calls forth truth and still retains the tension, the "it 
is and it is not" (p. 13), that metaphors in their indirection 
30 
create. McFague finds this "silent but present negative" 
(p. 13), this tension, to be a healthy aspect of metaphor to 
the degree that it points up constantly the fact that our 
language and our thought processes are comparative. To 
attempt to reify language, then, is to attempt to reify 
thought and thus to bring stagnation to the natural processes 
of thinking and creating our world. 
Basically, metaphor uses a better-known or more famil­
iar object or idea to point out a quality in common with 
the lesser-known object or idea. So the familiar is used to 
talk about the less-familiar or unknown. McFague (1982) 
defines metaphor as a comparison by which one sees one thing 
as another, "pretending 'this' is 'that' because we do not 
know how to think about 'this,' so we use 'that' as a way of 
saying something about it" (p. 15). Language and thought 
are metaphorical in nature. We think metaphorically; there­
fore, we speak metaphorically. We communicate with one 
another using the same forms with which we think. Murry was 
right when he said, "Metaphor appears as the instinctive and 
necessary act of the mind exploring reality and ordering 
experience" (see McFague, 1982, p. 32). Ordinary language, 
then, is the way we think and ordinary language is the lan­
guage of thinking by "indirection," by metaphor (p. 16). 
Also important to human thought is the fact that meta­
phor contains judgments about which "this" is compared to 
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which "that" and, as this paper will attempt to demonstrate, 
these judgments can be significant to the extent of narrow­
ing the way people think while at the same time altering the 
social and cultural climate. There are, then, good metaphors 
and poor metaphors. McFague discusses good metaphors thus: 
Good metaphors shock, they bring unlikes together, they 
upset conventions, they involve tension, and they are 
implicitly revolutionary. . . . Metaphorical thinking 
[is] . . . prophetic . . . [and] projects, tentatively, 
a possible transformed order and unity yet to be 
realized. (p. 17) 
Though metaphorical language is, in its best forms, 
rich language—true to the variety of ways our mind can think 
in comparison and by indirection—it demands interpretation. 
It begs us to ask, "What does this mean?" So we have a need 
to move beyond metaphors to conceptual language, which insists 
on similarities rather than on dissimilarities as metaphors 
do. 
McFague calls this move from the metaphorical to the 
conceptual a move from primary to secondary language and 
finds the model to be instrumental in this process. A model 
is a "mixed type" (p. 23) in that it borrows from both the 
metaphor and the concept. As a "dominant metaphor, a meta­
phor with staying power" (p. 23), a model becomes a major 
way of structuring and ordering experience while retaining 
some of the tension of the "is and is not" (p. 23). While 
models give us a way of thinking about the unknown through 
the known, they also provide us with a more organic, 
consistent, and comprehensive way of thinking than does the 
metaphor (p. 23). Thus models, according to McFague, "give 
us something to think about when we do not know what to 
think, a way of talking when we do not know how to talk" 
(p. 23). McFague cautions that models can become dangerous 
if they become literal, that is, if they begin to "exclude 
other ways of thinking and talking" and become "identified 
as the one and only way of understanding a subject" (p. 24). 
In essence, models "object to competition in ways that meta­
phors do not" (p. 24), and while they are necessary, they 
must be used with discrimination. 
McFague proposes that thinking does not stop, however, 
with metaphors and models; she asks for "conceptual inter­
pretation and criticism" (p. 25). The critique of metaphors 
and models, then, is the task of conceptual thought (p. 27). 
Conceptual thought attempts to generalize or find similar­
ities among various models and to give rise to systematic 
thought, on which we rely in ordering models into concepts. 
Any system of thinking, then, must rely on metaphor 
for richness, model for discrimination of dominant ideas, 
and concept for critique. When Tillich's theology is viewed 
from this perspective, it becomes apparent that it is concep­
tual in nature. Though it is insightful, it has lost the 
"and is not," the richness, that metaphorical language 
insists on. Tillich's purpose is to reinterpret, to critique 
33 
the dominant Christian symbols and metaphors of his time. 
And, although he has systematically reinterpreted many of 
them, his writing remains primarily within the realm of con­
cept. Therefore, while Tillich's discussion of ultimate 
concern is most useful for this study by getting at the idea 
that we are connected to and a part of a larger scheme of 
things from which we get our meaning for life, it does not 
offer the richness necessary to a language for communicating 
our depth of concern about the meaning and preservation of 
our existence—a conversation we have relegated largely to 
the private realm of our being. A new language, of necessity, 
must be metaphorically rich, providing many possibilities 
for what is_ as well as what is not. 
The framework for mythic language presented here is one 
based on language that can communicate ultimate concern. 
The language of this framework must have the ability to 
reveal and to communicate in two directions. While it must 
be able to get at the ground or essence of existence, the 
sacred connections to be examined more fully later, it must 
also have the capacity to carry this character and signifi­
cance of the revelation about the nature of our sacred con­
nections to other persons. It must be a language that can 
aid in calling into consciousness what the nature of ultimate 
concern is, and, at the same time, it must be a language 
people feel comfortable using—i.e., it must be perceived to 
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be ordinary and available to all people and yet have the 
ability to make extraordinary comparisons, ones which sur­
prise us into new meaning and insights. 
Defining Myth: A Historical Perspective 
Myth as approached in this study is not a reference to 
matters of a fictitious nature or to matters which are untrue. 
This use of the word myth, to denote something of a false 
nature, seems first to have appeared in our language during 
the 19th century, when scholars, very much under the influ­
ence of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, 
wrote about myth with respect to origins. For the 19th cen­
tury scholar, myth referred to ancient stories of primitive 
peoples, stories that explained the origins of the universe, 
their culture, and their gods, rites, and customs. Because 
primitive peoples held these explanatory stories to be literal 
representations of their origins and made them the basis 
upon which they organized their lives, 19th century scholars 
focused on myth as primitive man's functional equivalent of 
science (Dundes, 1984, p. 30). While primitive peoples saw 
their myths as sacred in nature, scholars of the 19th century 
saw them as pre-scientific, peculiar to an earl/ period or 
stage in human evolution (Dundes, 1984, p. 41). Nineteenth 
century scholars, then, were very much a product of the pre­
vailing influence of the science of their time. 
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According to Baumer (1978), in the 17th century science 
became the directive force of Western civilization, displac-1 
ing theology and antique letters. Science challenged the 
focus on the world of the spirit, replacing it with a focus 
on the material world. Baumer writes further about the 17th 
century influence of science: 
It [science] drove Christianity out of the physical 
universe into the region of history and private morals 
[emphasis added]; to an ever growing number of people 
in the two succeeding centuries [the eighteenth and 
nineteenth] it made religion seem outmoded even there. 
... It changed profoundly man's attitude toward custom 
and tradition, enabling him to declare his independence 
of the past, to look down condescendingly upon the 
"ancients" [emphasis added], and to envisage a rosy 
future. (p. 249) 
In addition, Baumer asserts that with the shift of emphasis 
from spirit and religion to the material world and science, 
improvement and change in oneself and one's world came no 
longer from within, i.e., from spirit, but rather from with­
out , i.e., from science. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) contrib­
uted to the swing from stress on the spiritual to an emphasis 
on the material and scientific by asserting that knowledge 
is both cumulative and tentative (Baumer, 1978, p. 253). 
Such ideas as these, once they became pervasive in the 
culture, would have to have a part in destroying the view of 
myth as a legitimate, though religious, explanation of origins 
and of the basis for ritual and the living of one's life in 
an ordered and connected, i.e., sacred and spiritual fashion. 
Knowledge revealed in myth to primitive peoples was final, 
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not tentative or cumulative. Melioration came from adherence 
to myths as revelations of the spiritual aspects of life. 
Myths determined the nature of one's goings and comings in 
the world as well as the nature of conservation and preser­
vation in relation to one's spiritual and political constitu­
tion . 
Science was responsible for making Christianity a sub­
ject of history and private morality rather than a phenomenon 
of the physical universe. Science was also responsible for 
removing myth from the context of natural phenomena and 
establishing it as a feature of ancient history, outdated 
morality, and pre-scientific speculation. Agreeing with 
this influence upon 19th century scholars of myth is Jan 
de Vries (1984) who, in writing about the influence of Max 
Muller, an influential 19th century scholar of myth, says: 
[His] theory demonstrates once more the gap that lay 
between nineteenth-century man and the sundry faiths he 
knew existed. To the extent that modern man's soul 
detached itself from Christianity, to the extent that 
Christianity was allowed to deteriorate into a mere 
moral lore as the core was taken out of its dogma and 
the sense for its mystery got lost, to that extent also 
man's understanding of other religions disappeared. It 
seemed to him that these religions were so naive that 
they could not have any connection with deep human expe­
rience. Max Muller's theory makes abundantly clear that 
he never fathomed belief. He was a man of his time, 
(pp. 39-40) 
De Vries' primary point is that to reach any understanding 
of myth that is at once accurate and useful, we must seek 
an accurate observation of primitive religious life to go 
along with other methods of examining myth. 
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One of the most remarkable and costly effects of the 
Scientific Age, however, was severing the ties between the 
present and the past, enabling us to declare our independence 
from the past (Baumer, 1978, p. 249), resulting in the neg­
lect of our roots in and connections to matters of a sacred 
and spiritual nature. Equally costly was the capacity that 
the Scientific Revolution bestowed on us to "look down con­
descendingly [emphasis added] upon the 'ancients'" (Baumer, 
1978, p. 249), those representatives of a rich primitive 
heritage, because they were of a pre-scientific age. It is 
my own contention that while this severance represents a 
change in our view of the spiritual and the sacred founda­
tions of our lives and of myth as an embodiment of those 
foundations, it also represents a dangerous phenomenon to 
the degree that it sets us up to become culturally and per­
sonally fragmented and alienated from the very nature of our 
being, i.e., from the matters of ultimate concern. 
Within the romantic movement of the 19th century there 
was some evidence that myth would begin to be taken more 
seriously again. As a reaction against the scientific inter­
pretation of nature prominent during the Enlightenment, 
writers of the 19th century—primarily the poets and drama­
tists—began to write about nature in imaginative and emo­
tional terms. At the same time myth began to be characterized 
as imaginative. Though this emphasis on the imaginative did 
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not restore the mythic connection to sacred and spiritual 
origins, it did carry with it a hint that myth was, according 
to Rogerson (1984), an "expression of the deepest creative 
potentialities of man" (p. 65). Eventually, Romantic writers 
and myth theorists began to see myth as an expression of pro­
found truths about human existence and a revelation of intui­
tions of truth that would not and could not be consciously 
available to more sophisticated people. Rogerson sees this 
as a movement away from the view of myth as inadequate science 
and toward a view of myth as symbolic interpretation—this, 
then, would constitute the underlying perspective on myth in 
the work of Jung (see Rogerson, 1984, pp. 65-66). 
With the advent, in the 20th century, of the scholarship 
of Jung and those influenced by him, myth once more began to 
be taken seriously as an acknowledgment of truth about our 
spiritual and political lives. Empirical research and 
attempts at demythologization actually have helped the status 
of myth in the 20th century. Honko (1984) , a Finnish folk-
lorist, outlines three primary forms of demythologization: 
(1) terminological, in which the actual word myth is avoided 
but the story istelf is retained and referred to as "holy 
story"; (2) total and compensatory, in which the mythical 
tradition is totally rejected because the stories are seen 
as unnecessary for the civilized mind and replaced with 
science; (3) partial and interpretative, in which while there 
is no rational basis for their literal acceptance, myths have 
nevertheless a symbolic value to the extent that what lies 
behind them is important (pp. 42-43). From demythologiza-
tion, then, we acquire the ideas that myth contains an element 
of the holy or sacred, i.e., that it describes what is sound 
and whole; that myth, if it is to be a viable study for the 
20th century mind, must acknowledge the development of civili­
zation and the advances of science; and that there is an 
extremely important symbolic element in myth, one rich in 
meaning. 
Acknowledging the prominence of myth research, Honko 
(1984) outlines 12 different ways that 20th century scholars 
have approached the subject: (1) as a source of cognitive 
categories; (2) as a form of symbolic expression; (3) as a 
projection of the subconscious; (4) as an integrating factor 
in man's adaptation to life (as. world view); (5) as a charter 
of behavior; (6) as a legitimation of social institutions; 
(7) as a market of social relevance; (8) as a mirror of 
culture, social structure, etc.; (9) as a result of historical 
situation; (10) as religious communication; (11) as religious 
genre; and (12) as a medium for structure (pp. 47-48). 
By classifying these approaches more broadly into four 
subgroups—historical, psychological, sociological, and 
structural—we can see how they overlap with elements of the 
mythic framework used in this paper. Myth is story, metaphor­
ical story, that works in two directions—both behind and in 
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front of the narrative—to produce meaning. As metaphorical 
language it gets at the sacred and spiritual connections with 
the Ultimate while at the same time prompting exegesis and 
hermeneutie interpretation of our present political and 
cultural situation. 
The positive qualities of myth are needed in the 20th 
century, which has been called the Age of Anxiety. We are 
reaping both the benefits and the horrors brought about by 
the Technological Revolution. For the first time in history 
we have the ability to make our lives easier with technolog­
ical advances like the computer and to destroy ourselves 
and the earth with nuclear power (and the power to choose 
between the two alternatives). Commenting on our technol-
ogized world, Jacques Ellul (1964) warned in The Technolog­
ical Society of the loss of the quality of being human result­
ing from "technique." He wrote: 
Indeed, the human race is beginning confusedly to under­
stand at last that it is living in a new and unfamiliar 
universe. The new order was meant to be a buffer 
between man and nature. Unfortunately, it has evolved 
autonomously in such a way that man has lost all con­
tact with his natural framework. (p. 428) 
Not only is humankind in this situation, Ellul declares, but 
the escape prerequisite to the re-establishment of roots 
appears nearly impossible: 
Enclosed within his artificial creation, man finds 
that there is "no exit"; that he cannot pierce the 
shell of technology to find again the ancient milieu to 
which he was adapted for hundreds of thousands of 
years. . . . Who is too blind to see that a profound 
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mutation is being advocated here? A new dismembering 
and a complete reconstitution of the human being so 
that he can at least become the objective (and also the 
total object) of techniques. (pp. 428, 431) 
Ellul's pronouncement articulates well the profound angst of 
modern humans cut off from the roots which for centuries 
defined the quality of being human. 
The quickened pace of our lives, the imminence of pos­
sible disaster, and a continued separation from our sacred 
and spiritual roots that is characterized by angst and anomie, 
disparity and despair, impotence and defeat, continually 
point up the need to communicate about the present-day situa­
tion and the need for a language which is accessible and 
rich for approaching these life-living matters. For a lan­
guage and therefore a metaphor to be empowering it must be 
grounded in knowledge that can speak to the problems of the 
age, the "situation" of our lives. In a time such as ours, 
when so many aspects of our lives are calling for grounding 
and direction, it is untimely and indeed superfluous to 
communicate, to do scholarship, to teach, to develop curricula 
about subjects and language of little or no relevance to 
the preservation and conservation of our world. Crucially 
serious times require crucially serious means of discovering 
and communicating knowledge that must of necessity be grounded 
in Ultimate concern and carry imperatives about how to pre­
serve our lives, how to conceptualize meaning, and how to 
conserve our sacred roots, our spiritual foundation. 
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To contribute to the situational problem of our age— 
which education must address if we are to survive—then, 
myth as metaphor must be able to perform two functions: it 
must show us the "ground of being" and provide direction and 
focus for our actions. Essentially, it must be spiritual and 
political, showing us the sacred nature of living. In order 
to understand more appropriately how the myth theorists 
discussed below contribute to the mythic framework presented 
herein, it is apropos to discuss further the nature of the 
contextual use of the concepts spiritual and political. 
Mythic Framework as Spiritual and Political 
By spiritual I am referring to our roots and connec­
tions to the essential aspects of living and being human, 
i.e., our union with the Ultimate, with the inner self, with 
other persons, with the larger society, and with the natural 
world. The claim is made here that our lives are not whole 
in fundamental ways if we do not recognize each of these asso­
ciations as essential to our understanding of being human. 
These relationships are spiritual, then, in that they cannot 
be ignored or severed without dire consequences—death of the 
person and/or the world. Spiritual connections, then, con­
stitute the "breath" of life in that they represent the 
cohesiveness and foundation of the essence of life itself. 
Taken together, these essential relationships constitute what 
is here referred to as one's spirituality. 
43 
While the spiritual aspect of myth works behind myth, 
emphasizing that the essential wholeness of being human is 
rooted in spirituality, the political aspect of myth works 
in front of myth and represents the way we live among people 
as participants in community and as citizens of the world. 
The political aspect of life is a demonstration of wisdom as 
to the most moral way to live one's life among others in 
community and in recognition of one's spirituality. The 
word political here denotes a participation in citizenship 
and community much broader and more comprehensive than that 
afforded by governmental politics alone. It is, rather, a 
reference to the totality of the way people choose to live 
their lives with and among other people and with themselves, 
a reference to the way we make significant decisions about 
living as citizens of the world, and a reference to the qual­
ity of life that ensues from such decisions. 
The framework for the political aspect of living is spir­
itual. In other words, the ethical and moral aspects of life, 
the way one chooses right or wrong conduct and establishes 
one's character, are determined by one's understanding of and 
participation in spiritual wholeness. Discourse about pol­
itics in this paper, then, refers to ethical and moral action. 
The political realm of life is synonymous with the ethical 
and moral realm. Acknowledging that ethical, moral, and 
political decisions are based on significant beliefs about 
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the world and one's place in it, those decisions are exam­
ined here with reference to their spiritual foundations. In 
essence, people choose to act in certain ways and to live 
their lives according to certain codes. 
The task of education, then, becomes twofold: to examine 
the spiritual connections, their holistic and individual 
nature, and to examine the nature of the deliberately lived 
political life that grows out of such an understanding. At 
its best political action becomes a moral duty of a preserv­
ing and conserving sort. At its worst it becomes action that 
ignores spiritual roots and is therefore amoral or action 
which deliberately defies spiritual roots and is therefore 
immoral. When one considers the alternative to living in 
recognition of these spiritual roots—death of the person 
and/or of the world—, political action becomes a profoundly 
sacred duty and education becomes an entity of the most val­
uable and necessary kind. 
A word about the meaning of conservative and preserva­
tive in connection with political duty is in order. Polit­
ical action as it is spoken of here is preservative in that 
it seeks to keep the holistic spiritual connections—to the 
Ultimate, to one's self, to the larger society, to the natural 
world—intact as viable forces in decision-making. Actions 
which defy or ignore or sever these connections would be 
avoided. Political action as it is spoken of here is also 
conservative to the extent that it recognizes the importance 
and immediacy of making decisions based on spiritual under­
standing. It thus limits itself in quality and in kind to 
those actions that keep our spirituality from being damaged, 
lost, or wasted. In a sense, this is an attempt to preserve 
a tradition, but the tradition being preserved is one far 
removed from the present culture, which since the Enlighten­
ment seems to have done little to examine what was positive 
about the spiritual and political nature of life previous 
to it. It is possible, then, and quite probable that polit­
ical actions that focus truly on spiritual preservation will 
be described as liberal in the present culturally conserva­
tive climate—and if not, definitely as radical to the degree 
that those actions will be vastly different in most cases 
from the norm established by the present culture. For exam­
ple, projects presently spoken of as monetarily progressive 
and successful would be examined not with respect to the 
financial success paradigm but rather with respect to whether 
those projects would enhance the quality of life on the 
earth in a life-giving sort of way. Would such-and-such a 
project contribute to the conservation of the natural resources 
or destroy them? Would it promote good will among people 
or would it seek to destroy peace and community? Would the 
project remind us of our relationship to the Ultimate or 
promote further the idea of a rootless self-enhancement? 
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Would it tend to promote individual self-understanding or 
destroy self-worth? 
In the next chapter we will examine the writings of 
several 20th century myth scholars who provide further 
insight into myth as spiritual and political/moral and into 
myth as an educationally viable source of knowledge about 
our lives. The writings of Jung, Neumann, Campbell, and 
Eliade are important ones for us as persons seeking to combat 
alienation and envision more holistic ways to live our lives. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONTEMPORARY MYTHIC PERSPECTIVES AND EDUCATION 
Introduction 
Of the 20th century scholars of myth, three have been 
of primary influence in the development of the dual nature of 
myth discussed here. Erich Neumann, Mircea Eliade, and 
Joseph Campbell focus their research on what various bodies 
of myth reveal about our foundations and origins as humans. 
In reference to the framework described above, these writers 
attend primarily to the features of the myth metaphor that 
work behind the myth, or to the realm described as the spir­
itual nature of myth. Each writer has, however, given spe­
cific reference to what I have described as the political 
realm of myth, or those features that work in front of the 
myth and are composed of those of our actions which are in 
turn based on the ways we choose to live our lives—essen­
tially our morality nature, broadly speaking. Each writer 
expresses a concern that because we in the 20th century have 
not occupied ourselves with the messages of myth as story— 
and more broadly as metaphor—we are suffering grave personal 
and cultural consequences. Each writer feels also that we 
can and should listen to the spiritual insights and messages 
of myth in order to improve our political/communal lives. 
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For Neumann, Eliade, and Campbell, then, myth has profound 
spiritual as well as political implications at a time in 
history when, in the main, we conceive of ourselves as sev­
ered from our spiritual roots. 
The Influence of Carl Jung 
To discuss myth seriously without some understanding 
of the scholarship of Carl Gustav Jung is impossible. Pri­
marily because he saw the unconscious as a more holistic and 
positive force in personality development than did Sigmund 
Freud, Jung broke with Freud, a proponent of depth psychology, 
to become the founder of analytical psychology. Delving 
more deeply than Freud did into the foundation of myth and 
symbol for the collective unconscious, Jung put forth the 
view that the various elements of the personality longed for 
integration. Jung taught that this wholeness was achieved 
through a process called individuation. 
Jung's work focuses on the concept of the archetype, 
which has become so significant in the study of myth that it 
figures into almost all modern scholarship on the subject. 
According to Jung (see 1958a, pp. 113-131; 1971, pp. 23-46), 
certain archetypes, or repeated themes, symbols, and images, 
originate in the collective unconscious and have implications 
for each of the three levels of the psyche. In essence, 
Jung distinguishes between the conscious and unconscious and 
writes that the unconscious is both personal and collective. 
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Jungian psychology, then, involves a study of the conscious, 
the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious, 
where archetypes originate. 
Jung designates the "I" or the "ego" as the mediator 
between the inner and outer world and thus of the perceivable 
.world or the conscious. The unconscious, then, is composed 
of material and perceptions which the ego does not readily 
comprehend. The personal unconscious is the storehouse of 
lost memories and concepts or ideas: those the conscious is 
not yet ready to deal with, either because of the pain that 
might be associated with their revelation, or because they 
are not sufficiently developed to have a significant effect 
on the ego. While the personal unconscious is individually 
unique, Jung warns that we should be careful not to place 
undue emphasis on it and chooses instead to make the collec­
tive unconscious the pivotal reference in his personality 
theory. 
The collective unconscious, according to Jung, is the 
storehouse for archetypes and as such is the most powerful 
influence on personality. The archetypes—basic mythic 
images and symbols of accumulated experiences from all pre­
vious generations of humankind—comprise such representations 
as hero, earth mother, death, birth and rebirth, unity, child, 
ultimate or god, and demon. These images, Jung asserts, 
have a profound influence on the development of personality 
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and even more complexly play a still more profound role in 
our collective development as humans. 
Because he is interested in self-actualization or indi­
viduation, Jung identifies the self, a system composed of 
all aspects of the unconscious, as a catalyst for the uni­
fication of all aspects of the personality. The self, then, 
works for harmony by seeking to integrate the various levels 
of the personality. Jung (1958b) writes: 
I have . . . suggested calling the total personal­
ity which, though present, cannot be fully known, the 
self. The ego is, by definition, subordinate to the 
self and is related to it like a part to the whole. 
. . . And just as circumstances or outside events happen 
to us and limit our freedom, so the self acts upon the 
ego like an objective occurrence which free will can 
do very little to alter. It is, indeed, well known that 
the ego not only can do nothing against the self, but 
is sometimes actually assimilated by unconscious com­
ponents of the personality that are in the process of 
development and is greatly altered by them. (p. 4) 
Thus, despite the emphasis given the unconscious, particu­
larly the collective unconscious, Jung's primary thrust is 
on the integration of the total human psyche, the conscious 
and the unconscious (de Laszlo, 1958, p. xx)—an integration 
which happens mainly through the medium of the self. 
Jungian psychology sets the stage for myth to act as a 
significant entity in the development of every personality 
and thus of humankind as a whole. Through his writings on 
the collective unconscious, Jung establishes that certain 
archetypes, mythic in nature, appear in the unconscious of 
all persons, giving a universal quality to personality 
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development. Thus, by inference, Jung establishes myth/ 
archetype as the single most influential factor in the devel­
opment of the entire human race. 
Referring to archetype—i.e., to myth—as an "as-if" 
(Jung, 1958a, p. 118), thus claiming the metaphoric quality 
of the myth archetype, Jung declares that there are severe 
consequences resulting from attempts to cut ourselves off 
from archetypal foundations. He writes: 
In reality we can never legitimately cut loose from 
our archetypal foundations unless we are prepared to 
pay the price of neurosis, any more than we can rid 
ourselves of our body and its organs without committing 
suicide. (p. 120) 
Jung expresses concern that if we do not "connect the life 
of the past that still exists in us with the life of the 
present, which threatens to slip away from it" (p. 120), we 
will suffer "a kind of rootless consciousness ... no longer 
orientated to the past, a consciousness which succumbs help­
lessly to all manner of suggestions and is, in fact, suscep­
tible to psychic epidemics" (p. 120). Writing in 1928, Jung 
in "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man" expressed this 
concern about modern men and women: 
Today, ten years after the war, we observe once 
more the same optimism, the same organizations, the 
same political aspirations, the same phrases and catch­
words at work. How can we but fear that they will 
inevitably lead to further catastrophes? Agreements 
to outlaw war leave us skeptical, even while we wish 
them every possible success. At bottom, behind every 
palliative measure there is a gnawing doubt. I believe 
I am not exaggerating when I say that modern man has 
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suffered an almost fatal shock, psychologically speak­
ing, and as a result has fallen into profound uncertainty 
[emphasis added]. (Jung, 1971b, p. 460) 
The survival of humankind as a collectivity of positively 
integrated and functioning beings depends, according to Jung, 
then, on asserted efforts of the personality to become whole, 
to work towards individuation—to integrate the conscious 
and unconscious into a properly functioning psyche. And the 
key to this positive and proper holistic development of the 
individual and, therefore, of the human race is the collec­
tive unconscious, the myth/archetype level of our psyche, 
which provides the foundation for our development and keeps 
us rooted in our humanity. 
Erich Neumann: 
Ethics, Community, Images, Education 
The rediscovery of the human and cultural strata from 
which these symbols [archetypes] derive is in the orig­
inal sense of the word "bildend"—"informing." Con­
sciousness thus acquires images (Bilder) and education 
(Bildung), widens its horizon, and charges itself with 
contents which constellate a new psychic potential. 
As the . . . collective human aspect is rediscovered 
and begins to come alive, new insights, new possibili­
ties of life, add themselves to the narrowly personalis-
tic and rigid personality of the sick-souled modern 
man. (Neumann, 1954, p. xxiii) 
Erich Neumann, a physician and student of C. G. Jung, 
furthered Jung's implications for the role of myth in ana­
lytical psychology by promoting the thesis that the individual 
consciousness passes through the same mythical, archetypal 
stages of development as does the history of human conscious­
ness as a whole. Basing his research on the archetypal stages 
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found in universal mythical stories surrounding the Uroboros, 
the World Parents and the Hero, Neumann acknowledged and 
expanded Jung's ideas presented in Psychology and the Uncon­
scious and Psychology of the Child Archetype, both of which 
expounded on the archetypes or primordial images of the 
collective unconscious. Neumann (1954), supporting Jung's 
theory, called these archetypes "pictorial forms of the 
instincts," because "the unconscious reveals itself to the 
conscious mind in images which, as in dreams and fantasies, 
initiate the process of conscious reaction and assimilation" 
(p. xv). 
Neumann's most important work, The Origins and History 
of Consciousness, published in German in 1949 and in English 
in 1954, examined in depth the repeated themes and symbols 
of mythological archetypes and showed their relationship to 
psychology and to culture. Neumann (1954) states his purpose 
for the work thus: 
It is the task of this book to show that a series of 
archetypes is a main constituent of mythology, that 
they stand in an organic relation to one another, and 
that the stadial [stage of development] succession deter­
mines the growth of consciousness. In the course of 
this ontogenetic development, the individual ego con­
sciousness has to pass through the same archetypal stages 
which determined the evolution of consciousness in the 
life of humanity. ... As organs of the psyche's 
structure the archetypes articulate with one another 
autonomously, like the physical organs, and determine 
the maturation of the personality •in a manner analogous 
to the biological hormone-components of the physical 
constitution. (p. xvi) 
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Obviously adopting an evolutionary (stadial) view of the 
development of personal and historical consciousness, Neumann 
shows through his research that myth is the hinge upon which 
a holistic and healthy development depends. 
It is important to note that Neumann is not concerned 
with the psychology of healthy individuals only, but that 
he is equally involved in the ramifications of collective 
psychology and how it figures in the lives of people at this 
particular time in history. Crediting the mythological arche­
types with both describing and prescribing the course of 
human history, Neumann wrote: 
The relation between the transpersonal and the per­
sonal—which plays a decisive role in every human life— 
is prefigured in human history. . . . Analytical psychol­
ogy considers the structure of the psyche to be deter­
mined by a priori transpersonal dominants—archetypes— 
which, being essential components and organs of the 
psyche from the beginning, mold the course of human 
history. (p. xxi) 
The key to healthy development—both personal and collec­
tive—according to Neumann, depends on our rootedness and 
our understanding of the archetypes of the collective uncon­
scious as they are revealed in myth. 
While Neumann as an analytical psychologist is dedicated 
to the study of the healthy psyche, his primary thrust is a 
social and political one. Neumann (1954) relates his basic 
mythological research to what he calls the "narrowly per-
sonalistic and rigid personality of the sick-souled modern 
man" (p. xxiii)* Neumann believes that the tendency of 
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modern humankind to reduce all "transpersonal contents to 
perosnalistic terms is the most extreme form of secondary 
personalization" (p. 387) . When secondary personalization, 
the assigning to the personal matter belonging to the trans-
personal, becomes a generalized phenomenon, the responding 
culture forms a.crisis. When transpersonal forces are 
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devalued, Neumann warns, there results "a dangerous overval­
uation of the ego" (p. 388) and a devaluation of "the uncon­
scious forces of which he [Western man] is afraid" (p. 388). 
Both by overvaluing the ego and by devaluing the "unconscious 
forces," Western humankind is ignoring the importance of myth 
in both the personal and transpersonal—and consequently in 
the culture—areas of life. Neumann, then, believes that 
the present cultural crisis is a direct consequence of our 
insistence on severing the unconscious or mythic archetypal 
level of the personality from the other levels. Proper devel­
opment can occur only when there is proper fluidity between 
the conscious and the unconscious within the terms of this 
relationship set by the collective unconscious. With the 
present cultural phenomenon in mind, Neumann has described 
the status of our language and also proposed a "new ethic," 
based on a positive integration of the unconscious, to replace 
the old one, which he describes as dangerous. 
One area in which Neumann locates the phenomenal display 
of the crisis of our present civilization is in our language. 
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Neumann shows how ignoring the importance of the collective 
unconscious or mythic component of the psyche has led to 
language that both denigrates the transpersonal and inflates 
the importance of ego consciousness because of its disengage­
ment from the mythic archetypal level of the psyche. Neumann 
(1954) describes, for example, our frequent use of "apotro-
paic defense-magic" in our language in an attempt to explain 
away and "exorcise anything dangerous with a glib 'nothing 
but' or 'it's not half as bad as you think'" (p. 388). In 
this same vein Neumann describes our personalization of the 
Godhead into the "All-loving and Merciful Father" and the 
"Eiapopeia of children" while ignoring the "primordial divin­
ity of the Creator and the fierce, infinitely strange, ances­
tral totem-animal that dwells in the human soul" (p. 388). 
According to Neumann, this personalization of God also 
ignores the fact that the Ultimate cannot be known in any 
absolutely true and final concrete sense. 
This manner of describing God, Neumann says, is a 
rationalization in which the "archetype is elaborated into a 
concept" (p. 389) disengaged from the collective unconscious. 
Neumann writes (1954): "The line runs, as we saw, from the 
archetype as an effective transpersonal figure to the idea, 
and then to the 'concept' which one 'forms'" (p. 389). With 
regard to the concept of God, Neumann asserts that our per­
ception of God is now derived "wholly from the sphere of 
consciousness" (p. 389). Neumann asserts, however, that such 
perceptions occur when the ego is "deluded enough to pretend" 
that it is not responsible to the unconscious for its meaning. 
Sadly Neumann writes: "There is no longer anything trans-
personal, but only personal; there are no more archetypes, 
but only concepts; no more symbols, only signs" (p. 389). 
Here Neumann's concern is close to that of McFague 
(1982), who in writing about metaphor, model, and concept 
pointed out the cultural and social fallacies that arise when 
metaphors, described as close in character to the mythic 
archetype of the unconscious, become models and are concep­
tualized into "the only" way of viewing the Kingdom of God. 
McFague says that to change a "root-metaphor of a paradigm is 
a basic change, ... a new religion" (pp. 145-146) . Like 
Neumann, McFague emphasizes that we exist only in relation­
ship and consequently "must use the relationships nearest 
and dearest to us as metaphors of that which finally cannot 
be named" (p. 194). Such a use of metaphors, she asserts, 
prohibits us from "absolutizing any models of God" (p. 194) 
and leaves open new possibilities for describing the rela­
tionship. Both McFague and Neumann recognize the prohibi­
tive quality of language in describing God, especially when 
the language becomes exclusive, cut off from its roots, non-
metaphorical and nonsymbolic, ignoring the richness of the 
fact that there is more to the meaning of the Ultimate than 
can be said—ever. 
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Neumann does not just leave us with a description of a 
civilization in crisis. Instead, he draws inferences and 
suggests solutions for ethics and for living in community. 
Neumann writes that repression of the collective unconscious, 
the mythic archetypal level, is a corruption of the compensa­
tory relationship between the conscious and unconscious. 
He (1954) illuminates the cultural implications of this view 
this way: 
This splitting off of the unconscious leads on the one 
hand to an ego life emptied of meaning, and on the other 
hand to an activation of the deeper-lying layers which, 
now grown destructive, devastate the autocratic world 
of the ego with transpersonal invasions, collective 
epidemics, and mass psychoses [emphasis added].... 
Even when it is not so acute as to bring on a psychic 
sickness, the loss of instinct and the overaccentuation 
of the ego have consequences which, multiplied a mil-
lionfold, constellate the crisis of civilization 
[emphasis added]. (p. 389) 
According to Neumann, then, just an overarching, unbalanced 
emphasis on one level of psychic development, without a focus 
on the collective unconscious as the basis for development, 
can lead to an unbalanced cultural phenomenon. 
In Depth Psychology and the New Ethic, published in 
German in 1949 and in English in 1969, Neumann (1969) 
describes an "old ethic" and offers a solution for our cul­
tural problems through his description of the "new ethic," 
which he says presupposes the "old ethic" (p. 15). To Neumann 
the "new ethic" is 
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A development and differentiation within the old ethic, 
confined at present to those uncommon individuals who, 
driven by unavoidable conflicts of duty, endeavour to 
bring the conscious and the unconscious into respon­
sible relationship. (p. 15) 
Basically, Neumann describes the present world crisis in 
terms of a collective inability to deal with evil. He 
(1969) wrote: 
No appeal to old values and ideals can shield us from 
the recognition that we live in a world in which evil 
in man is emerging from the depths on a gigantic scale 
and confronting us all, without exception, with the 
question: "How are we to deal with this evil?" . . . 
The phenomenon which brands our epoch is a collective 
outbreak of the evil in man, on a scale never before 
manifested in world history. (pp. 25-26) 
Primarily Judeo-Christian in origin, the old ethic, according 
to Neumann, carries with it "an assertion of the absolute 
character of certain values which are represented by . . . 
moral 'oughts'" (p. 33). Neumann describes the old ethic 
as taking certain positive, dominant symbols like the saint 
or wise man and perceiving these values or symbols as "codi-
fiable and transmittable values which govern human conduct 
in a 'universal' manner" (p. 33). 
With the above assertion Neumann moved to what he 
believes to be the heart of the problem with the old ethic: 
the denial of the negative. He (1969) wrote: 
It is always held that the ideal of perfection can and 
ought to be realised by the elimination of those qual­
ities which are incompatible with this perfection. The 
"denial of the negative," its forcible and systematic 
exclusion, is a basic feature of this ethic. . . . 
(pp. 33-34) 
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Neumann asserts that the "denial of the negative" has taken 
hold through two methods—suppression and repression. Sup­
pression is the "deliberate elimination by ego-consciousness 
of all those characteristics and tendencies in the personal­
ity which are out of harmony with the ethical value" (p. 34), 
while repression causes the 
excluded contents and components of the personality 
which run counter to the dominant ethical value [to] 
lose their connection with the conscious system and 
become unconscious or forgotten—that is to say, the 
ego is entirely unaware of their existence. (p. 35) 
While suppression and repression are distinguished by a 
line which is indeed finely drawn, a further distinction 
can be made: "Repressed contents, unlike those suppressed, 
are withdrawn from the control of consciousness and function 
independently of it" (p. 35). The conscious mind, then, is 
aware of suppressed factors while it is unaware of repressed 
phenomena. 
The consequences of both suppression and repression, 
however, are devastating to the human mind and to the cul­
ture. Neumann (1969)) describes it thus: 
This split between the world of ethical values in the 
conscious mind and a value-negating, anti-ethical world 
in the unconscious which has to be suppressed or 
repressed generates guilt feelings in the human psyche 
and accumulations of blocked energies in the uncon­
scious. Naturally, these are now hostile to the con­
scious attitude, and when they finally burst their 
dams they are capable of transforming the course of 
human history into an unprecedented orgy of destruc­
tion [emphasis added]. 
The old ethic must be held responsible not only 
for the denial of the shadow side but also for the 
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creation of the resultant split, the healing of which 
is now of crucial importance for the future of human­
ity. (p. 58) 
Neumann plaes some emphasis on this split resulting from 
the old ethic and asserts that "the further progress of man­
kind will . . . depend ... on whether it proves possible 
to prevent the occurrence of this splitting process in the 
collective psyche" (p. 58). 
Referring to the healing which becomes necessary to 
prevent the destruction of humankind, Neumann characteris­
tically describes the need to reestablish the relationship 
between the unconscious and the conscious, the collective 
and the individual. He writes that while the 
ultimate aspiration of the old ethic was partition, 
differentiation and dichotomy, as formulated in the 
mythological projection of the Last Judgement under 
the image of the separation of the sheep from the 
goats, the good from the evil, the ideal of the new 
ethic ... is the combination of the opposites in 
a unitary structure [emphasis added]. . . . The aim 
of the new ethic is the achievement of wholeness, of 
the totality of the personality. (pp. 101-102) 
It is important under the new ethic for persons to be psy­
chologically autonomous rather than good. This shift in 
emphasis from goodness to autonomy is a significant one to 
the extent that it signals a change in focus from "outside" 
values to "inside" conversation with one's own psyche. This 
wholeness that one must achieve in order to establish "the 
basis for creative processes which give birth to new values" 
(p. 103) is acquired through centroversion—Neumann's 
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description of the "glue" that seeks to build integration in 
the personality by bringing and holding together both good 
and evil. 
Neumann relates the necessity in the new ethic of "doing 
evil" to the classic development of the archetypal hero, who 
must commit certain crimes—such as murder of the primal 
parents—in order to liberate the ego and grow to maturity. 
Not committing such a crime symbolically leads to the "retarded 
development" of the individual who chooses to continue to 
be a "good child" at the expense of the sacrifice of maturity 
and independence in later life (pp. 104-105). Maturity and 
independence, then, are bought at the expense of good behav-
i or. 
At the same time the individual must assimilate "evil" 
for proper development, s/he must also experience dangers 
unprotected by the "bulwark of any kind of convention" 
(p. 106) as provided for within the old ethic. In other 
words, Neumann writes, 
It is no longer possible for the individual to retain 
his balance simply by clinging to the traditional law; 
the result of this may be disturbances and distortions 
in development which ancient man—and in fact any myth­
ological view of the world which knows the transpersonal 
powers as gods—would have interpreted as "Aphrodite's 
revenge." (p. 106) 
Calling for a shift away from looking to the outside 
culture for behavioral codes to looking into one's own psyche 
for guidance for each and every moral issue, Neumann 
63 
recognizes the uncertainty involved with such a radical 
change from the norm of the old ethic. He (1969) writes: 
To surrender the moral certainty about good and evil 
provided by the old ethic, stamped as it was with the 
approval of the collective, and to accept the ambiguity 
of the inner experience is always a difficult undertak­
ing for the individual, since in every case it involves 
a venture into the unknown, with all the danger which 
the acceptance of evil brings with it for every respon­
sible ego. (p. 108) 
Though Neumann acknowledges that one person may consider 
certain factors and situations evil while another may not. 
(p. 107), he is more concerned that "the share of evil 
'allotted' to an individual by his constitution or personal 
f a t e  . . .  b e  w o r k e d  t h r o u g h  a n d  d e l i b e r a t e l y  e n d u r e d  b y  
him" (p. 110). Further, Neumann clarifies the nature of 
good and evil by stating that the "acknowledgement of one's 
own evil is 'good'" but to try to "transcend the limits of 
the good which is actually available and possible—is 'evil'" 
(p. 114). One must, according to Neumann, by accepting evil, 
"accept the world and himself" as well as the "dangerous 
double nature which belongs to them both" (p. 117). In the 
final analysis, Neumann declares the following formulation of 
values of good and evil for the new ethic: 
Whatever leads to wholeness is "good"; whatever leads 
to splitting is "evil." Integration is good, disinte­
gration is evil. Life, constructive tendencies and 
integration are on the side of good; death, splitting 
and disintegration are on the side of evil. . . . Our 
estimate of ethical values is no longer concerned 
with contents, qualities or actions considered as 
"entities"; it is related functionally to the whole. 
Whatever helps that wholeness which is centered on the 
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self towards integration is "good," irrespective of the 
nature of this helping factor. And, vice versa, what­
ever leads to disintegration is "evil"—even if it is 
"good will," "collectively sanctioned values" or any­
thing else "intrinsically good." (p. 127) 
Thus, the new ethic is individualistic in its task but also 
and equally collective in that by bringing on the stability 
of the individual psychic structure, it contributes to the 
whole, the collective. As Neumann wrote: 
It is becoming clear that, although different arche­
typal constellations may be dominant or recessive among 
different nations and races at different times, the 
human species is nevertheless one and indivisible in the 
basic structure of its mind. . . . (p. 135) 
That is to say the human species is one in its archetypal 
collective unconscious. 
Because the new ethic assumes communication and cohesion 
between the conscious and unconscious and between the indi­
vidual and the collective, it is interesting to note Neumann's 
handling of collective guilt. The old ethic provided for 
scapegoats, for the individual elimination of evil by pro­
jection onto weaker persons; the new ethic provides for the 
sharing of collective guilt where "the individual assumes 
personal responsibility for part of the burden of the collec­
tive, and he decontaminates this evil by integrating it into 
his own inner process of transformation" (p. 130). Most 
starkly, however, Neumann talks about collective social 
guilt resulting from the Nazi rule by declaring that "the 
murdered are also guilty—not only the murderer" (p. 26). 
He continues: 
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Those who saw and failed to act, those who looked away 
because they did not want to see, those who did not see 
although they could have seen, and those, too, whose 
eyes were unable to see—each and every one of these is 
actually in alliance with evil. We are all guilty— 
all peoples, all religions, all nations, all classes. 
Humanity itself is guilty [emphasis added]. (p. 26) 
This collective guilt, characteristic of the new ethic, 
can work to aid individuals in finding "an inner liberation 
of the collective, which in part at least is redeemed from 
this evil" (p. 130). Neumann's psychic wholeness, then, 
leads to both personal and collective acceptance and integra­
tion of guilt and this acceptance and incorporation pay off, 
in turn, in psychic wholeness and health both individually 
and collectively. 
This cohesive good-evil view also attempts to correct 
the aforementioned skewed view of the Godhead, for now the 
Godhead can be accepted as the creator who "made light and 
darkness, good and evil" and humans can perceive themselves 
as paradoxical totalities in "which the opposites are linked 
together as they are in the Godhead" (Neumann, 1969, p. 147). 
And, according to Neumann, only when "the creative interrela­
tionship of light and shadow is accepted and lived as the 
foundation of this world—is life in this world truly possi­
ble for men" (p. 147). At this point only, Neumann writes, 
will "the unity of creation and of human existence escape 
destruction by that disastrous rift which threatens the 
future of the human race" [emphasis added] (p. 147) . It is 
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here and only here that Neumann sees any hope for the sur­
vival of the race. By liberating the Godhead from the good-
only conception, he has again made available the view of the 
Godhead as greater than we can comprehend. The Godhead can 
now be approached, not in concretized conceptual form, but 
rather in symbolic and metaphorical language—language that 
calls forth far greater images and analogies, symbols more 
in keeping with the more comprehensive view of Godhead called 
for within the new ethic. 
In a paper on educational discourse, one cannot neglect 
to note that Neumann (1954) recognized the significnce of 
two factors for consciousness--images or bilder and education 
or bildung (see epigraph above) (p. xxiii). Referring to the 
German derivatives, he shows that he knew that to change the 
consciousness of humankind meant focusing on and bringing 
forth the images of the unconscious. Both the images (bilder) 
and education (bildung) are informing (bildend). Essentially 
education, derived in English from the Latin root educare, 
means "to lead or draw out." Used in the context of Neumann's 
scholarship, it means to lead or draw out those images or 
archetypes which can properly inform our consciousness so 
that we no longer exist as "sick-souled" persons. Drawing 
out the archetypes and images is a tremendous burden for 
education but at the same time a proper one in light of our 
present cultural situation. The question remains, then, How 
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can persons primarily concerned with education inform or 
draw out these images or archetypes for the conscious mind? 
Mircea Eliade: Sacred History, Initiation, 
Education, Literature 
Myths lead us into a world that cannot be described but 
only "narrated," for it consists in the history of acts 
freely undertaken, of unforeseeable decisions, of fabu­
lous transformations, and the like. (Eliade, 1958, 
p. xv) 
It is not surprising that critics are increasingly 
attracted by the religious implications, and especially 
by the initiatory symbolism, of modern literary works. 
Literature plays an important part in contemporary civ­
ilization. . . . Hence it is only natural that modern 
man should seek to satisfy his suppressed . . . needs by 
reading certain books that . . . contain mythological 
figures camouflaged as contemporary characters and offer 
initiatory scenarios in the guise of everyday happen­
ings. (Eliade, 1958, pp. 134-135) 
Mircea Eliade, long-time professor of the history of 
religions at the University of Chicago, has written widely 
about mythic patterns, especially as they reveal themselves 
in the rituals of primitive peoples. Primarily focusing on 
myth-ritual and the Jungian archetypes, Eliade, through his 
research, found myth to be a revelation of sacred time and 
space and saw in the sacred history of myths a critical 
outline for the conduct of everyday life. For Eliade (1984) 
myth revealed "truth par excellence" (p. 138). Taking into 
account "the mythology in its totality" and the "scale of 
values which such mythology implicitly or explicitly pro­
claims" (p. 140), Eliade saw myth as having the paradigmatic 
function of justifying "the existence of the world, of man 
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and of society" (p. 141). He (1959) wrote: "Hence the 
supreme function of the myth is to 'fix' the paradigmatic 
models of all rites and all significant human activities— 
eating, sexuality, work, education, and so on" (p. 95). Myth 
seen as sacred history, then, is paradigmatic in that it 
"relates how things came to be . . . [and] lays the founda­
tions for all human behavior and all social and cultural 
institutions" (pp. x-xi). 
Eliade found too that myth manifests itself differently 
in traditional societies than in modern societies. Of tradi­
tional people Eliade (1958) found that they perceived them­
selves to be "created and civilized by Supernatural Beings" 
and consequently believed that the sum of their behavior and 
activities belonged to sacred history and that this history 
had to be "carefully preserved and transmitted intact to suc­
ceeding generations" (p. xi). Basically, primitive peoples 
gained their identity from the belief that "at the dawn of 
Time, certain things happened to . . . [them], the things 
narrated by the myths" (1958, p. xi). So traditional peoples 
saw themselves as the "end product of a mythical history, that 
is, of a series of events that took place in illo tempore, at 
the beginning of Time" (1958, p. xi). To the traditional 
people, then, everything significant, creative and powerful 
that has ever happened took place "in the beginning, in the 
Time of the myths" (1958, p. xi). Outwardly and inwardly, 
traditional peoples lived their lives closely associated with 
myth and relied on myth to tell them what it meant to be 
human both individually and communally. 
Eliade (1958) wrote about modern peoples very differ­
ently. By his account, modern people consider themselves 
historical beings "contit.uted by the whole history of human­
ity" (p. xi) and, further, consider the "history that pre­
cedes [them to be] a purely human work" (p. xi). What is 
more, according to Eliade, they feel that they have the 
"power to continue [history] and perfect it indefinitely" 
(p. xi). Eliade recognized that modern humankind's absorp­
tion with history is itself connected with the view that 
humans can manipulate and create it. Eliade (1960) wrote, 
"As it has often been said, the anxiety [emphasis added] of 
modern man is obscurely linked to the awareness of his his­
toricity, and this, in its turn, discloses the anxiety of 
confronting Death and Non-being" (p. 235) . For modern peoples 
influenced by the Enlightenment, then, there is no delib­
erate outward or inward acknowledgment of myth as a viable 
entity in the living of everyday life. Eliade points to this 
shift from an emphasis on religion and spirituality to an 
emphasis on the individual as the controlling force and prime 
mover in both the broad sweep of history and the ordinary 
living that makes up its daily accounts. He asserts, how­
ever, that though there is no outward involvement with myth 
70 
apparent in the lives of modern peoples, a Jungian-type 
involvement with myth does appear to the extent that modern 
humankind has a deep and problematic curiosity regarding 
history, time, death and nonbeing, a social feature that 
does not appear in the lives of traditional peoples. 
Further pointing up the differences between traditional 
and modern peoples on the subject of myth is the place of 
initiation in the societies of both. Initiation ceremonies 
were extremely important in ancient societies, serving as 
they did as the education young people received in what it 
meant to be mature males and females in a given community. 
According to Eliade (1958), the male generally passed through 
a ceremony or series of ceremonies involving a symbolic death 
and resurrection—death to the life of youth and resurrec-
tion/re-creation into maturity as a grown male, now a member 
of the society. Initiation ceremonies taught the males every­
thing they needed to know about functioning as mature persons 
and at the same time connected this knowledge to the begin­
ning of time, to the sacred beginnings. For females, the 
education passed on through initiation ceremonies centered 
on the sacred mysteries of being female and as such of being 
primarily in charge of creation and birth and fertility. To 
both males and females was presented the notion of creation 
and/or procreation, the significance of which had been 
revealed in the beginning, during sacred time. So the living 
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of mature lives had a sacred base: the spiritual aspect of 
myth was revealed and the political aspect of myth was man­
dated in these ceremonies. 
For modern peoples there are no more sacred initiation 
ceremonies on the order of those of primitive peoples. 
There are remnants, like New Year's Eve celebrations and 
graduation ceremonies and the dedications of newborn chil­
dren, left among our societies. Still there are no cere­
monies to teach us what it means to be an adult male or 
female in the modern world. There are no sacred ceremonies 
which teach us about our spirituality; there are no prescrip­
tions for political behavior based on the sacred understand­
ing of life. Eliade is right in his assessment of our anxi­
ety—it is the result of not knowing what we are or what we 
can become or even where we are from. 
For us there is no education about sacred matters and 
education does not serve in an initiatory capacity of the 
sort described above. We live in anomie, separated from 
our sacred roots and connections and groping for meaning in 
life and death. Judged against the standards and dimensions 
of the ancient conception we also are not mature, since for 
them maturity included a sense of the sacred. We suffer 
anxiety because we are not educated about our sacred roots, 
about our spirituality. We avoid maturity because it has 
nothing to offer in a world that promotes youth and avoids 
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the old. Maturity gives us no prescriptions for conduct; 
no promise of procreation or life. It represents, instead, 
a nearness of death in its most unmeaning form—nothingness. 
Maturity reminds us that age means death and death means 
nonbei ng. 
The question that surfaces in reading Eliade is this: 
Where can we find the true, sacred, and applicable mythic 
foundation so that we can begin addressing the value of the 
question of meaning and maturity for our own modern lives? 
With respect to Eliade's research, this also seems to be 
the question for education. Eliade writes that modern human­
kind can find myth in narrative and in literary works (1958, 
p. xv, and pp. 134-135). It is here that "modern man . . . 
[can] satisfy his suppressed . . . needs" and find "mytholog­
ical figures camouflaged as contemporary characters and offer 
initiatory scenarios in the guise of everyday happenings" 
(1958, pp. 134-135). Northrop Frye and others have carried 
out this interest in literature through their Jungian crit­
ical interpretations. (See Anatomy of Criticism, 1957; "New 
Directions from Old," 1959; and "Archetypes of Literature," 
1975.) 
For the purposes of this study, then, Eliade serves to 
point out the differences between traditional and modern 
societies with regard to their views of the importance of 
myth for their individual and communal lives. He is able to 
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demonstrate that modern humankind is separated from myth but 
still shows a connection to it in the longing to understand 
history, the involvement in making it, and the anxiety about 
temporality. Also, Eliade points out that modern literature 
shows us the unconscious side of ourselves and reveals myth 
to us. Consequently the study of literature for modern human­
kind is terribly important. 
Joseph Campbell: Hero as Spiritual Healer 
The modern hero-deed [emphasis added] must be that of 
questing to bring to light again the lost Atlantis of 
the co-ordinated soul. Obviously, this work cannot be 
wrought by turning back, or away, from what has been 
accomplished by the modern revolution; for the problem 
is nothing if not that of rendering the modern spir­
itually significant [emphasis added]--or rather . . . 
nothing if not that of making it possible for men and 
women to come to full human maturity through the con­
ditions of contemporary life. (1968, p. 388) 
The old teachers knew what they were saying. Once we 
have learned to read again their symbolic language, it 
requires no more than the talent of an anthologist to 
let their teaching be heard. (1968, p. vii) 
For many years a member of the literature faculty of 
Sarah Lawrence College, Joseph Campbell has long been one 
of the more prolific and popular writers and lecturers on 
myth in contemporary society. Among the many works to his 
credit are The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949), which 
presents an outline of the composite hero, and the four-
volume work The Masks of God (1959-68) which contains volumes 
on primitive, oriental, occidental, and creative mythology. 
Campbell's concern is with the condition of modern societies 
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and the involvement. of modern peoples in myth, which he sees 
as containing essential instruction for productive living. 
His own study of mythology led him to write about the mono-
myth (a term borrowed from James Joyce's Finnegans Wake) of 
the hero, for him a type of model savior of the modern world. 
In an interview just before his death (in November of 
1987), Campbell outlined his basic views regarding myth and 
gave a definition of mythology as a collection of metaphors 
or "an organization of symbolic images and narratives meta­
phorical of the possibility of human experience and fulfill­
ment in a given culture at a given time" (Abrams, 1987, p. B8). 
Campbell warns, however, that mythic symbols should never be 
taken as absolute truth, for "when you're dealing with these 
symbolic forms . . . the ultimate reference is beyond all 
categories of human thought" (p. B8). Campbell goes on to 
talk about the content of mythology thus: 
The themes that myths have to deal with don't change, 
and those themes are human life—the transformation of 
childhood into adulthood, the psychology of dependency 
transformed into one of self-responsible judgment and 
action. And then the whole business of passing away 
instead of lasting forever. 
These are the things the myth has to deal with, 
but it has to deal with them now in terms of a contem­
porary, scientifically interpreted universe and a 
society that is in flux instead of one that is static. 
(Abrams, 1987, p. B8) 
One of Campbell's central critical insights is this: while 
there is no competition between mythic and scientific knowing 
in post-Enlightenment thought, to suppress mythic knowing is 
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tragic and eventuates in psychosis and the advent of unhealthy 
societies (see 1972, pp. 1-18). This position brings him 
into line with those theologians who espouse the view that 
there is no conflict between science and religion. 
In the essay "Schizophrenia--the Inward Journey," from 
Myths to Live By (1972), Campbell outlines his concern for 
raising children in the contemporary world. He feels that 
parents have to face the problem of certainty with regard 
to whether the "signals which they are imprinting on their 
young are such as will attune them to, and not alienate them 
from, the world in which they are going to have to live" 
(p. 220). Campbell feels that young people should be able 
to align themselves "constructively with . . . [the cul­
ture's] progressive, decent, life-fostering, and fructifying 
elements" (p. 220). He (1972) writes: 
And so we have this critical problem, as I say, this 
critical problem as human beings, of seeing to it that 
the mythology . . . that we are communicating to our 
young will deliver directive messages qualified to 
relate them richly and vitally to the environment that 
is to be theirs for life, and not to some period of 
man already past, some piously desiderated future, 
or--what is worst of all—some querulous, freakish sect 
or momentary fad. And I call this problem critical 
because, when it is badly resolved, the result for the 
miseducated individual is what is known, in mythological 
terms, as a Waste Land situation. (pp. 220-221) 
Campbell's concern for the proper education of youth is 
profound to precisely the degree that he sees what miseduca-
tion has done to the adults in our world. 
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In The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1968) Campbell 
describes a kind of immaturity existing in our society that 
proceeds from the refusal to acknowledge myth as a spiritual 
aid in our individual and social development. He explains 
that "we [as adults] remain fixated to the unexorcised images 
of our infancy, and hence disinclined to the necessary pas­
sages of our adulthood" (p. 11). Campbell (1968) becomes 
impassioned in his description of the American aversion to 
agi ng: 
There is even a pathos of inverted emphasis: the goal 
is not to grow old, but to remain young; not to mature 
away from Mother, but to cleave to her. And so, while 
husbands are worshiping at their boyhood shrines, being 
the lawyers, merchants, or masterminds their parents 
wanted them to be, their wives, even after fourteen 
years of marriage and two fine children produced and 
raised, are still on the search for love—which can come 
to them only from the centaurs, . . . and other con­
cupiscent incubi of the rout of Pan, either as in the 
second of the above-recited dreams, or as in our popular, 
vanilla-frosted temples of the venereal goddess, under 
the make-up of the latest heroes of the screen, 
(pp. 11-12) 
Without a proper integration of myth into the modern lives 
of humankind, then, Campbell sees the possibility of individ­
uals and societies that are schizophrenic and immature—of a 
world where people are "cut-off," where the "individual is 
thrown back on himself" (1972, p. 221). 
There i_s hope in this situation if we look at the hero, 
the subject of Campbell's "monomyth" or primary myth of sig­
nificance for our development into mature persons participat­
ing fully and positively in the world. In The Hero with a 
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Thousand Faces, Campbell examines the mythologies of many 
societies in an effort to develop a composite view of the 
hero and his journey through life. Campbell writes that the 
usual path of the "mythological adventure of the hero is a 
magnification of the formula represented in the rites of 
passage: separation--initiation—return: which might be 
named the nuclear unit of the monomyth" (1968, p. 30). Camp­
bell's entire composite of the hero is cited below for later 
reference: 
The mythological hero, setting forth from his 
commonday hut or castle is lured, carried away, or 
else voluntarily proceeds, to the threshold of adven­
ture . There he encounters a shadow presence that 
guards the passage. The hero may defeat or conciliate 
this power and go alive into the kingdom of the dark 
(brother-battle, dragon-battle; offering, charm), or be 
slain by the opponent and descend in death (dismember­
ment, crucifixion). Beyond the threshold, then, the 
hero journeys through a world of unfamiliar yet 
strangely intimate forces, some of which severely 
threaten him (tests), some of which give magical aid 
(helpers). When he arrives at the nadir of the 
mythological round, he undergoes a supreme ordeal and 
gains his reward. The triumph may be represented as 
the hero's sexual union with the goddess-mother of the 
world (sacred marriage), his recognition by the father-
creator (father atonement), his own divinization (apoth­
eosis), or again—if the powers have remained unfriendly 
to him—his theft of the boon he came to gain (bride-
theft, fire-theft); intrinsically it is an expansion of 
consciousness and therewith of being (illumination, 
transfiguration, freedom). The final work is that 
of the return. If the powers have blessed the hero, he 
now sets forth under their protection (emissary); if 
not, he- flees and is pursued (transformation flight, 
obstacle flight). At the return threshold the transcen­
dental powers must remain behind; the hero re-emerges 
from the kingdom of dread (return, resurrection). The 
boon that he brings restores the world (elixir) [all 
above emphasis added]. (1968, pp. 245-246) 
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In addition to the summary above, Campbell provides a dia­
grammatic summary which appears here as an appendix. 
The primary importance of the hero for this study lies 
in Campbell's observation that the "hero comes back from 
this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on 
his fellow man" (p. 30). This boon is in the form of spir­
itual understanding of the world and what it means to be 
human living in the world. Thus the hero becomes a role 
model, a character to be emulated in the quest for maturity. 
It is worth noting that the hero does not achieve 
stature without making a necessary transit through a series 
of great ordeals; this suffering follows the break with the 
"home" he has always known. These ordeals--which model the 
initiation ceremonies of primitive societies—signal the 
fact that the hero, spiritually transmogrified, is now a new 
being ready to live with the wisdom he has gained through 
survival of the ordeals necessary for adulthood. 
The hero, then, is a spiritual model as well as a polit­
ical model in that he has lived and continues to live the 
..life of one who knows firsthand the significance of his 
connections to the ultimate, to the created world, to his 
fellow humankind and to himself, and who acts accordingly. 
One point Campbell does not make but which can be made 
from a reading of his discourse on the hero is that maturity 
comes with discomfort and at great price. Very much to the 
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contrary, we in the Western world--and particularly in the 
United States—expect great rewards and respect, and recog­
nition and status, to come easily, without trial or hardship 
and without sacrifice. Campbell's composite hero points out 
that great reward comes only through great sacrifice and 
trial. Certainly the example of the hero would not be a 
popular one in the modern world. 
About the present-day hero Campbell (1968) writes: 
The modern hero, the modern individual who dares to heed 
the call and seek the mansion of that presence with 
whom it is our whole destiny to be atoned, cannot, 
indeed must not, wait for his community to cast off 
its slough of pride, fear, rationalized avarice, and 
sanctified misunderstanding. . . . It is not society 
that is to guide and save the creative hero, but pre­
cisely the reverse [emphasis added]. And so every one 
of us shares the supreme ordeal—carries the cross of 
the redeemer—not in the bright moments of his tribe's 
great victories, but in the silences of his personal 
despair. (p. 391) 
And Campbell thinks there is hope that we will, eventually, 
choose to find heroes who are spiritually and politically 
exemplary of holistic living. He (1972) writes, "Whenever 
men have looked for something solid on which to found their 
lives, they have chosen, not the facts in which the world 
abounds, but the myths of an immemorial imagination" (p. 20). 
Implications 
Neumann, Eliade, and Campbell have all acknowledged the 
significance of contemporary personal and social crises—the 
results of our disengagement from the spiritual aspect of 
our lives—that have far-reaching consequences, both personal 
and social, for the ways we conduct our political affairs. 
Neumann has called on us to look for those images in the 
collective unconscious that can educate us about what it 
means to be centrovert.ed (psychically mature) individuals 
operating in society under the rules of the "new ethic"—that 
is, integrating both the good and the necessary bad into 
our lives so that, in becoming mature both individually and 
socially, we can prevent the sort of perverse social disas­
ters that have arisen in the past from the repression and 
suppression of archetypal images. 
Eliade recognizes that we lack the significant initia­
tion ceremonies and events that define individual and social 
adult roles for us and educate us about what those roles 
entail. He observes, too, that while many claim to live 
lives primarily profane in nature, remnants of our sacred 
lives still emerge to remind us that we really are sacred 
by nature. Eliade believes that these sacred symbols and 
events—which remain in our lives and, at times, appear 
unexpectedly—come from the collective unconscious to remind 
us of our sacred nature. To deny this is to admit to our 
alienation from the sacred. 
Campbell, too, is conscious of the lack of the spir­
itual in our lives, but also of the great need for a particu­
lar kind of spirituality—one that will emerge in the form 
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of a hero who can "save us" and make our lives significant 
again by teaching us the nature of the spiritual and giving 
it direct meaning for our lives. Campbell sees the hero as 
the composite need of all humankind for a spiritual leader 
to provide a kind of spiritual glue for our lives through 
deeds of a heroic nature. Campbell's hero, Eliade's tradi­
tional ceremonies, and Neumann's idea of centroversion all 
teach the concept of maturity from the perspective of connec­
tion to the spiritual and sacred aspects of our lives. Only 
within that framework can we participate in the political 
action of positive community effectively as preservers and 
conservers of the positive connections we have to the ulti­
mate, to ourselves, to others and to the natural world. 
Each writer sees that a solution to this culturally and 
personally defined alienation can come only through a neces­
sary reconnection to the mythic aspect of our nature, that 
is, to our spiritual roots. For cultures, societies, and 
communities to become positive places for people to live, 
those people must rediscover for themselves their personal 
spiritual foundations—their connections to the ultimate, 
the community, the inner self, and nature. 
The primary implications for education, then, come from 
the idea that we are alienated from our spiritual nature 
as persons and as a society, but also that this alienation 
must be alleviated if we are to survive as individuals and 
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as a society. So the task of education is to teach us how 
to survive holistically in connection with our spiritual 
roots—that is, in positive relationship with the ultimate, 
with our inner lives, with the community and the natural 
world—and as persons who act politically and morally to 
preserve these spiritual roots for the continuation of our 
race and world. 
Each of the above theorists has indicated means by which 
education could serve as a force for reestablishing the 
connections necessary to preserving our foundation as holis­
tic persons in a healthy society—with positive political 
missions for the preservation and conservation of our 
society and culture. Neumann, concerned with the "narrowly 
persona 1istic and rigid personality of the sick-souled modern 
man" (1954, p. xxiii), calls for a rediscovery of the "strata" 
from which the mythic archetypes of our existence emerge. 
To begin with, to become conscious of those images necessary 
to alleviate our "soul-sickness," we must first make contact 
with these images through education. An education that would 
bring forward these archetypes or images is, according to 
Neumann, alive with "new psychic potential" for a new life, 
one without the cultural atrocities committed in the past. 
While Neumann would most likely promote dream study and depth 
counseling as a primary means of discovering these mythic 
images that he finds to be so important for our education 
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as well as our growth as persons, Eliade hints at a more 
accessible text for education in general. Eliade feels that 
the mythic images available in narrative, in the stories 
of "acts freely undertaken, of unforeseeable decisions, of 
fabulous transformations, and the like" (p. xv) are instru­
mental in helping modern man attune himself to his mythic 
heritage. He asserts, too, that literature plays an impor­
tant "part in contemporary civilization" and that it is here 
that modern man can go to "satisfy his suppressed . . 
needs" (1958, pp. 134-135). Thus Eliade promotes story and 
literature as matrices for the mythic archetypes and images 
of the spiritual aspects of our lives. 
Campbell, a professor of literature, has carried this 
definition of the role of literature the farthest by point­
ing out the particular image he feels can amost readily edu­
cate us about the spiritual. The hero, whom he finds to 
be both spiritual and political hero, perfectly combines 
spiritual connection with proper preserving and conserving 
political action. The essential mythic images, then, if 
we are to listen to these three theorists, can be found by 
seeking those mythic archetypes of images in literature and 
story that focus on the life of a hero who combines effec­
tively spiritual and political life. The discovery of these 
images Neumann calls education. 
If we accept the premise that these archetypes of the 
collective unconscious are so important for education, then 
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this question remains: How are we to approach these images 
in educational discourse? How can we get at these images 
so that we can talk about their importance? 
In the next chapter we will examine the possibility 
of developing a pedagogy of myth through the example of an 
analysis of a powerful narrative. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ESTABLISHING CANON: MYTHIC FRAMEWORK AND EXEGESIS 
Both the spiritual and the political features of myth 
presented herein are essential to the alleviation of aliena­
tion experienced by contemporary people. This study indicates 
that, personal and social alienation can be combatted through 
a reconnection to mythic images and symbols buried in our 
collective unconscious. To live a life of meaning, then, 
in which the valuable lessons of myth carry over into our 
social lives, we must be able to call up and rely on images., 
and thus language, which perpetuate discourse about these 
aspects of our lives, which are no less important for remain­
ing obscured much of the time. In other words, we must have 
means of expression regarding the most important concerns 
we have, regarding those concerns of ultimate importance. 
Without a mechanism for such expression, our most crucial 
concerns about issues of ultimate importance will continue 
to be suppressed in our conversations, in our most personal 
actions, and in our social decisions. 
Education must teach that living meaningfully involves 
operating in the spiritual and political realms at the same 
time. It is not possible to live a meaningful life by 
operating in the spiritual realm only, cut off from the world 
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of politics and morality, any more than it is possible to 
participate meaningfully in political and moral life while 
cut off from spiritual existence. Further, to attempt to 
lead a life cut off from either realm is both spiritually 
devastating and politically and morally dangerous. 
In an age when we experience fragmentation and aliena­
tion both personally and socially, especially at a time when 
we so desperately seek wholeness for our lives, it is imper­
ative that we as educators find ways not only of using the 
mythic dimension as a critique of our present situation in 
education but of reforming what it is we do and talk about 
in our attempts at educating whole persons for living in a 
healthy society. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine further the 
nature, scope, and focus of the mythic framework here 
described with the goal of characterizing an educational 
canon that will serve to diminish alienation and promote 
holistic living and community. Myth operates at the juncture 
where we become grounded in the essential nature of our spir­
itual and political/moral connections. Persons who "buy 
into" this framework, to use Ricoeur's (1978) terminology 
(p. 240) , essentially repent in the sense of choosing to 
change their lives, to operate on different ground. New 
life focuses on the living out of the interconnectedness 
of the spiritual and political dimensions, and on the 
participation in the process of continuing to discover the 
richness of meaning of the mythic framework for our personal 
and social living. The problem for education, then, is two­
fold: the canon must be, first, located, and then "called 
out" for characterization. 
If we call on the suggestions of Neumann, Eliade, and 
Campbell in Chapter III, it seems reasonable to rely upon 
their indications that for modern persons myth is available 
in narrative, that is, in story of significant meaning. 
For this reason, this chapter examines a story from the 
mythic perspective for its political and spiritual implica­
tions in an attempt to discover elements of myth within it 
and to characterize further the canon for educational dis­
course revealed in myth. It is my contention that there 
is an-existing and accessible canon for myth; there are, 
as well, existing methods for discovering mythic elements 
in literature. 
Myth as Significant Narrative 
While Eliade (1958, 1960) and Campbell (1968, 1972) 
primarily examine the narratives and stories of traditional 
and ancient peoples, both men express the belief that mythic 
elements can be found in modern writings, too. It is my 
present contention that mythic elements like those described 
in Chapter III, which identify a preoccupation with the spir­
itual and political features of life, can be found in both 
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ancient and modern narrative. These narratives can be about 
gods and goddesses or about the ins and outs, the everyday 
trials, of living with one's self and with others. These 
narratives can have a religious bent to them, can have reli­
gious symbolism in them, but can also be about events and 
happenings considered nonreligious or profane in nature. 
Eliade's concept of the sacred and the profane proposes a 
perspective here which suggests that, though the stories 
may appear to be profane in nature, they are also equally 
sacred since the profane is nothing more than a response 
to the sacred, which exists a priori. 
The stories that could be chosen for studies from the 
perspective of mythic framework are mainly those stories 
that present situations calling for action and those that 
present and examine narrative about ways of living in the 
world. The stories are those which "grab" us for reasons 
not always readily apparent. Usually, therefore, the story 
"calls" us to read it again and again, with further meaning 
revealed each time. Often such a story will not "let us 
go." Its psychic hold is such that it pushes itself into 
our consciousness at strange times—in the supermarket, when 
we are reading other stories, in dreams, at the dinner table. 
In essence the stories, though they may seem ordinary, are 
ones which when examined can call forth extraordinary insight 
about the meaning of everyday living. 
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In this discussion myth has been identified as metaphor 
in the sense that it has been characterized as having the 
ability to call forth meaning about what is and also what 
i s not, and to create a tension with its images (McFague, 
1982) . Here myth is described as operating in much the same 
way that Ricoeur (1978) describes the workings of parables: 
Parables are radically profane stories. There are no 
gods, no demons, no angels, no miracles, no time before 
time, as in the creation stories, not even founding 
events as in the Exodus account. Nothing like that, 
but precisely people like us. . . in a word, ordinary 
people doing ordinary things: selling and buying, let­
ting down a net into the sea, and so on. (p. 239) 
Ricoeur goes on to say that the focus of the parable is on 
that plot which contains a paradox: while the stories appear 
to be "narratives of normalcy," they are, on the other hand, 
descriptions of the extraordinary--the Kingdom of God 
(pp. 239-240). According to Ricoeur—and this is the way 
McFague describes the prophets, too—parables ask us to think 
metaphorically rather than conceptually. Ricoeur (1978) 
describes it this way: 
The Gospel says nothing about the Kingdom of Heaven, 
except that it is like. ... It does not say what it 
is, but what it looks like. This is hard to hear. 
Because all our scientific training tends to use images 
only as provisory devices and to replace images by 
concepts. We are invited here to proceed the other 
way. And to think according to a mode of thought which 
is not metaphorical for the sake of rhetoric, but for 
the sake of what it has to say. ... No translation 
in abstract language is offered, only the violence of 
a language which, from the beginning to the end, thinks 
through the Metaphor and never beyond. The power of 
this language is that it abides to the end within the 
tension created by the images. (p. 242) 
Stories chosen for the mythic heuristic process, then, 
should be those which in their normalcy can act as metaphor 
for what is apparent, what is hidden as well as what could 
be missing. 
Ricoeur (1978) and McFague (1982) make another point, 
which serves as a cautionary note: no metaphor is in itself 
a complete description of the phenomenon being examined. 
Therefore, while a particular parable might give insight 
about the Kingdom of Heaven, no parable has the capability 
of giving the complete insight. And while a powerful metaphor 
like God the father might call up significant insight about 
the Kingdom of God, it becomes suppressive in itself when 
it is the only metaphor used to describe the kingdom. Like­
wise, one story cannot have the power to describe adequately 
the mythic framework presented here; but significant stories 
can provide depth of insight in a metaphorical context. 
One last, but important, tenet might be noted briefly 
in this description of myth as significant narrative. If 
we are to accept Joseph Campbell's (1968) assertion, the 
story must present at least one significant character who 
can serve as the hero called into action and placed in the 
position of having value-ridden choices to make. 
Myth will be sought, then, in stories of significance 
to the extent that they: continually "call" for our atten­
tion to their various facets; may or may not deal overtly 
with the sacred; can work metaphorically, using ordinary 
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events and persons to call forth extraordinary comparisons; 
and present a protagonist who can be considered the hero. 
I have chosen to offer an exegesis of the ancient story 
of Ruth in this chapter as an example of the heuristic 
process and therefore of the way we might get at the spir­
itual and political mythic images in narrative. I chose 
the story of Ruth precisely because for years this story 
has "haunted" me in the ways suggested above. I could as 
easily have chosen Flannery O'Connor's "The Displaced Person" 
or Katherine Anne Porter's "The Jilting of Granny Weatherall" 
for this study since both of these stories also examine 
events in the everyday lives of people attempting to live 
with others. Both stories call up images of spiritual connec­
tions and resulting political and moral responses. And also 
these stories are accessible. The story of Ruth, however, 
provides a further richness for this discussion in that Ruth 
possesses heroic and mythic qualities of a greater degree 
than the protagonists of the other two stories. 
The story of Ruth of the Hebrew scriptures is a story 
of female friendship and one little discussed in commen­
taries on Hebrew scriptures in general, and in writings 
about women of the Hebrew scriptures in particular, because 
Ruth is not felt to be characteristic of the other women 
presented in the scriptures. (See Nunnally-Cox, 1981; Swid-
ler, 1979; Trible, 1978) . 
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The Heuristic Process and Exegetic Method: 
Mythic Textual Criticism 
Since we are dealing with narrative in this study, 
literary, or in this case specifically textual, criticism 
seems to be one of the best methods of examining the story 
chosen. Textual criticism is primarily a hermeneutic method 
that seeks to get at the meaning of a piece of literature. 
With literary criticism there is generally a particular per­
spective from which the critic works and which determines 
how the critic "goes at" the text. Consequently, the mean­
ing of the text is colored and shaped by the method and per­
spective of the critic. Nevertheless, there i_s a resulting 
interpretation that lends itself to discourse about the text 
and the worth of the text for our lives. Biblical textual 
exegesis is a critical analysis of a word, passage, or entire 
text with reference to the biblical source itself as well 
as to the means of "leading out" or "guiding out" of the 
source's meaning. Exegetic work also implies a particular 
perspective from which the critic works and which determines 
the kinds of examinations the exegete performs on the text. 
Biblical exegetes use a literary text, primarily, but also, 
generally, a great deal of historical data to discuss the 
meaning behind a text.--the meaning determined, in the main, 
by the historical period from which the text arose. 
It is very difficult to determine the exact period in 
which the story of Ruth arose because it seems to be an 
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ancient folktale later transposed to the period when it was 
written. This phenomenon adds a historical, social, and 
canonical puzzle to the mysteries of the text itself. What 
possessed the fathers of the biblical canon to include such 
a book in the Hebrew scriptures? Certainly it sheds little 
light on itself as a text of the times—that is, it does 
not tell us in specific detail about the period or how the 
people lived or what their peculiar problems were: rather 
it is a text whose production of universal meaning via mythic 
insights may be a function of its specifically political 
content—was it a propaganda story about non-Hebrew people 
and the covenant? Was it a legitimization of David as a 
proper leader--a non-Hebrew leader of distinction? Little 
is known about its inclusion in the biblical canon. For 
this heuristic study, however, these issues are not of pri­
mary concern. What does matter is that the exegesis of Ruth 
be performed from an appropriate perspective of the critic 
in an attempt to find meaning characteristic of the mythic 
educational canon. 
Terry Eagleton (1983) and Janet Gunn (1984) have 
described a text as utilitarian: in other words, the critic 
is free to do what he or she wants in order to discover mean­
ing. Gunn (1984), in describing Flannery O'Connor's concept 
of displacement, said: "I have every intention ... of 
being a crass utilitarian . . . since I will be making use 
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of it [O'Connor's art] to look at the world" (p. 2). Terry 
Eagleton (1983) espouses a similar view when he writes: 
Discourses ... of all kinds, from film and television 
to fiction and the languages of natural science, produce 
effects, shape forms of consciousness and unconscious­
ness, which are closely related to the maintenance or 
transformation of our existing systems of power. They 
are thus closely related to what it means to be a person. 
Indeed "ideology" can be taken to indicate no more than 
this connection--the link or nexus between discourses 
and power. Once we have seen this, then the questions 
of theory and method may be allowed to appear in a new 
light. It is not a matter of starting from certain 
theoretical or methodological problems: it is a matter 
of starting from what we want, to do, and then seeing 
which methods and theories will best help us to achieve 
these ends [emphasis added]. Deciding on your strategy 
will not predetermine which methods and objects of study 
are most valuable. As far as the object of study goes, 
what you decide to examine depends very much on the 
practical situation. (pp. 210-211) 
Thus a justification for methodological focus and textual 
choice is provided. 
The exegesis of Ruth here is in a sense a feminist 
literary criticism since I am looking primarily at the women 
in the story and at what their lives are like in a patri­
archal society. The feminist perspective for literary 
criticism is useful here, too, to the extent that the primary 
and significant persons of the story are females trying to 
make their way in the world without male counterparts. Such 
criticism serves also to point up the concept of metaphor 
discussed by McFague (1982), in which the text presents what 
is and what is not. In feminist literary criticism it is 
important to describe both what is and what is not there. 
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Eagleton (1983), however, is quick to point out that all 
criticism, regardless of its name, is in reality political 
criticism to just the degree that it gets at how people live 
their lives, and how well they live their lives, and where 
they face suppression, and where they have power. 
So even though the focus of Ruth's story is on women, 
it is also political. But primarily because I see the 
spiritual as the foundation for the political, this examina­
tion is of the spiritual foundations of the story itself. 
The exegesis of Ruth is a hermeneutic study of two women 
who live in the world and whose actions arise from a founda­
tion of spirituality. And while I agree with Eagleton that 
all criticism is political, I  also find that all criticism 
is equally spiritual. So this exegesis will provide a 
description of the spiritual condition of the characters 
and situations involved. 
As a hermeneutic study of myth as spiritual and polit­
ical—as existent in the lives of three women who must figure 
out a way to continue to remain alive and, if possible, to 
live abundantly in a society where they are of little impor­
tance—this study examines the spiritual connections of the 
women involved—to the society, to themselves, to community, 
to the natural world, to the ultimate—and the political 
and moral actions to which their spirituality gives rise. 
The critical focus, then, is on the politics of spirituality. 
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The perspective is that of a woman looking at the story of 
women. 
Ruth is mainly a hero—not a heroine, because this 
latter term seems to imply the dainty, prescribed, and cir­
cumscribed role of a woman of little actual weight who must 
live by the rules of others. This one is a woman of great 
strength and courage and not one to be considered the coun­
terpart of the male hero, with whom the female heroine is 
usually in love. Ruth is to be taken seriously by herself, 
without a male counterpart. Therefore, she will be referred 
to as the hero, not the heroine. 
The Story of Ruth 
Ruth, a biblical canonized book of only five chapters, 
is a biographical account of three women who find themselves 
widowed in Moab. Naomi, Ruth's mother-in-law, with her hus­
band and two sons had previously left Judea to escape famine. 
After living in Moab for some time, and after having acquired 
wives for her two sons from the native people, Naomi, along 
with her two daughters-in-law, finds herself widowed. Wish­
ing both younger women well, Naomi begs them to return to 
their families, where they can be cared for, and marry again, 
for Naomi has no means of caring for them or providing new 
husbands according to the laws of the land. Knowing nothing 
else to do, she plans to travel back to Bethlehem, her home 
city, alone. Dutiful and loving, Orpah, respecting her 
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elder, follows her mother-in-law's advice and returns to 
her family. Ruth, however, refuses to obey, chooses a more 
radical and, as it turns out, higher calling, and against 
Naomi's wishes follows her to Judea. After arriving in Beth­
lehem, Ruth works to provide for the two women by gleaning 
as a poor person in the fields behind the workers of Boaz, 
one of Naomi's relations. Eventually, Ruth convinces Boaz 
to accept his familial responsibility by marrying her. Fol­
lowing her suggestion, Boaz makes the necessary legal 
arrangements, marries Ruth, and fathers a son by her, provid­
ing an offspring for Naomi, the childless widow. A genealogy 
added later relates that Ruth is the great-grandmother of 
King David. 
A Situation Calling for Action 
All three women must make decisions about their future 
lives. Indeed, the patriarchal laws of the land dictate 
that there is no life for any adult woman without the proper 
affiliation with a man as husband or son. Each woman makes 
a different kind of decision. Naomi and Orpah decide to 
return to their homes—to familiarity and to people they 
know—while Ruth decides to journey to a foreign land with 
Naomi, a woman who can promise her no future. 
Of the three women, Naomi, the mother-in-law, has suf­
fered the greatest loss: not only has she no husband, she 
has lost her sons as well. There is no one to care for her 
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under the levirate laws. Levirate law provided for the care 
of women who lost their husbands and had no sons: the dead 
husband's brother was to marry his widowed sister-in-law 
(Deuteronomy 5:5-10). Naomi is devoid of community except 
for the foreign daughters-in-law for whom she has great 
affection but whom she rejects as being unable to provide 
the kind of support she apparently needs. She knows that 
she cannot choose to remain in Moab as a widow in a cultural 
situation which offers her no relief. Though she seems to 
be depressed and a little disoriented—not surprisingly, 
considering the losses she has sustained and which affect 
her in every aspect of her life--she must decide what to 
do to take care of herself. Her singleminded obsession with 
returning to her homeland is not only a reasonable response 
to her situation but perhaps the only viable choice she has 
to consider. At least in Bethlehem she can be among people 
with whom she is familiar, if she cannot be among family. 
Jean Baker Miller (1986), in Toward a New Psychology 
of Women, shows how loss of relationship can bring on depres­
sion and loss of self. Miller writes that female development 
proceeds on a basis different from male development in that 
women place more emphasis on relationships than men do, orga­
nizing their lives around them. She explains: 
One central feature is that women stay with, build on, 
and develop in a context of connections with others. 
Indeed, women's sense of self becomes very much orga­
nized around being able to make and then to maintain 
99 
affiliations and relationships. Eventually, for many 
women the threat of disruption of connections is per­
ceived not as just, a loss of relationship but as some­
thing closer to a total loss of self [emphasis added]. 
(p. 83) 
Miller goes on to talk about depression in this context: 
Such psychic structuring can lay the groundwork for 
many problems. Depression, for example, which is 
related to one's sense of the loss of connection with 
another(s) [sic], is much more common in women. 
(p. 83) 
Miller's stance is supported by Maggie Scarf (1980) 
in Unfinished Business; Pressure Points in the Lives of 
Woman, and by Carol Gilligan (1982) in In a Different Voice; 
Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Scarf (1980) 
writes that a woman's "inherently interpersonal, interdepen­
dent, affiliative nature . . . her orientation toward other 
people" is her major underlying vulnerability causing depres­
sion (p. 599). Gilligan (1982) adds that the "mourning that 
accompanies all life transitions can give way to the melan­
cholia of self-deprecation and despair" (p. 171). 
While Naomi's decision to return to her homeland is 
a reasonable one under the circumstances, her actions sug­
gest that she lacks vision to the degree that she has chosen, 
in the past, to make her significant connections according 
to the culturally accepted norm, that is, exclusively to 
the relational males in her life. To lose these persons, 
then, is to experience loss of self. Instead of taking com­
fort in the relationships of very willing daughters-in-law, 
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she, in her self-pity, chooses instead to send them away. 
While it is fitting enough for their own futures that she 
should send them away, it is sad that Naomi has not seen 
these women as having sufficient value for her life to offer 
her support in a time of bereavement. She has not allowed 
them to achieve enough significance in her life to provide 
the kind of "interpersonal, interdependent, affiliative" 
relationships that could have offered support at such a time 
of need, in even this cultural situation. Possibly she could 
have benefited from the recognition of other kinds of signif­
icant. relationships—from female friendships, perhaps—and 
prevented, even at the time of such great loss, the further 
loss of self. 
At the time of her departure from Moab Naomi, in depres­
sion and self-pity, describes her situation thus: "Have 
I yet sons in my womb . . .? I am too old to have a husband. 
. . . It is exceedingly bitter to me . . . that the hand 
of the Lord has gone forth against me" (Ruth 1:11, 12, 13). 
It is important to note that Naomi apparently refuses to 
speak on the journey to Bethlehem--"She said no more" 
(Ruth 1:18)--and that, totally absorbed in her own grief, 
she fails to see that Ruth also has suffered losses. Naomi 
has grown no less bitter and no less depressed by the time 
of her arrival in Bethlehem. To the townspeople she says, 
101 
"Do not call me Naomi [Pleasant., Sweet] , call me Mara 
[Bitter], for the Almighty has dealt very bitterly with 
me. I went away full, and the Lord has brought me back 
empty. Why call me Naomi, when the Lord has afflicted 
me and the Almighty has brought calamity upon me?" 
(Ruth 1:20-21; Harmon, 1953, p. 838) 
So on a rather, lengthy journey Naomi has found no resources, 
either within herself or without, to aid in alleviating her 
grief, her sense of loss, or her depression. Because of 
her acceptance of prevailing cultural norms regarding rela­
tionships, she has absolutely no vision with respect to the 
possibility of other options for significant relationships 
in her life. She cannot even affirm Ruth, whose allegiance 
is unquestionable. Her only choice is depression—which 
could last until the solution she understands can be arrived 
at. In essence, Naomi is spiritually devastated—having 
suffered a loss of connections to persons she loved. She 
is therefore suffering from a spiritual fragmentation which 
leaves her unable to perform any political function except 
to return to her homeland. 
Leaving Naomi on her arrival in Bethlehem, we turn to 
Orpah, the daughter-in-law who obeyed her mother-in-law and 
went home. Orpah is the woman in the story who was conven­
tionally good. She not only did the sensible thing for her 
life by returning home, where there was the possibility of 
her finding a new husband and having children, she also 
showed proper respect by obeying the older woman. Indeed 
Naomi feels no remorse or disappointment that Orpah chooses 
102 
to return home and actually holds this daugher-in-law's 
decision up to Ruth as the example of what Ruth should do: 
"See, your sister-in-law has gone back to her people and 
to her gods; return after your sister-in-law" (Ruth 1:15). 
Ironically it is Orpah that we hear no more about. 
The Interpreter's Bible (Harmon, 1953) offers insight 
about the origin of Orpah1s name. The popular etymology 
of the name, according to this reference, is "stiff-necked" 
because she turned her back to Naomi and went home. Though 
Harmon, the writer of the commentary, finds this popular 
meaning to be "farfetched," he does offer a second root, 
one which provides an appropriate comparison to her charac­
ter. This second root means "cloud," which by itself means 
little until we read that a derivation of Ruth's name could 
have meant "water abundantly" (pp. 834-835). The contrast 
between cloud and rainfall sheds light on the characters 
of the two women as having promise for providing sustenance 
for growth, but remaining ungiving, as with Orpah, while 
actually providing the substance for fertility and growth 
with real rain, as with Ruth. 
There can be little doubt that Orpah serves as a foil 
for Ruth and although the name etymologies highlight this 
contrast, I feel that there is an even more significant dif­
ference between the two women, one apparent in the ways they 
envision goodness as it relates to actions. There is a 
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broad conceptual difference between "being good" and "doing 
good." The ancient Hebrew teaching was to "do good," not 
to "be good." Perhaps even so long ago as the time of this 
book the tension between the two concepts existed; certainly 
this is the dilemma facing Orpah and Ruth. And the dilemma 
pits culture against inner experience—centers around poli­
tics and morality alienated from our spiritual foundation, 
or politics and morality grounded in a deep sense of spir­
ituality and connections to the significant aspects of our 
lives. Today when we ask children to "be good" little girls 
and boys, we are in reality asking them to obey the estab­
lished rules of the social order. When we ask a child to 
"do good," we are asking him or her to evaluate possible 
choices and to act out of an understanding of the issues 
based on a deep sense of our spirituality. Generally when 
we speak of goodness to children we are not asking them to 
make their own measured choices and neither is Naomi in her 
request that the women return to their own families. Naomi 
is asking for obedience. 
The Hebrew understanding of "goodness" involves making 
decisions based on one's relationship to God. To "do good" 
means to act in accordance with the understanding of the 
goodness of God as it relates to his creation in all of its 
wholeness. To act otherwise implies fragmentation and 
alienation from the creation—from oneself, others, the 
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natural world. Some give this alienation as a definition 
for sin. The story of Cain and Abel is an example of a story 
that points out the alienation which results from choosing 
to do evil. In the scene after Cain has murdered Abel God 
reminds Cain that anger can be conquered: 
"Why are you angry, and why has your countenance 
fallen? If you do wel1, will you not be accepted? 
And if you do not do well [emphasis added], sin is 
couching at the door; its desire is for you, but you 
must master it." (Gen. 4:6) 
It does not just happen that a person "does good." A 
thoughtful choice is involved. As we see in this Genesis 
story, to make decisions on any foundation other than the 
spiritual is to break the God-humankind relationship set 
out in the creation. 
The concept of "goodness" becomes even more muddled 
when we confuse goodness with unquestioned obedience of other 
persons. The story of Ruth seems to demonstrate that on 
occasion the highest good can be disobedience. Certainly 
Ruth disobeyed and as a result became a significant woman 
in Hebrew history, while Orpah obeyed and became an unknown. 
The significant factor in these decisions is neither dis­
obedience nor obedience in and of itself, however, but 
spirituality and the way the two women understood their duty 
in relation to their connections to themselves, to others, 
to the society, and to the Ultimate. Orpah obeys in follow­
ing the rules of the culture (outside herself) , while Ruth 
disobeys in following the rules of spirituality, of love 
for the Ultimate and caring for one's neighbor (within her­
self). I might add that Ruth's decision is illustrative 
of Neumann's (1969) observation regarding the "new ethic" 
and the incorporation of good as well as evil into one's 
life in an effort to bring wholeness to a fragmented world. 
Under this ethical rubric the culturally popular and expected 
decision is not always the most spiritually thoughtful one 
to choose. After all, what would we have thought of Ruth 
had she obeyed Naomi and sent an elderly woman off on her 
own, consumed with grief over her losses? Certainly her 
decision would not have defined good of the most spiritual 
kind. 
In the context of myth as spiritual and political, Orpah 
appears to be alienated from her spiritual connections and 
thus from her moral and political decisions. She appears 
not to acknowledge any foundation for making decisions 
except obedience to others. Because of this her actions 
are fairly thoughtless. In Jungian terms, Orpah relies upon 
the ego--an outward consciousness—in making her decisions: 
thus she does not rely upon the self, the force which seeks 
to integrate the conscious with the unconscious, and the 
spiritual with the political, in the process of making deci­
sions. Orpah's decision to follow Naomi's wishes and return 
to her mother is therefore indicative of spiritual, political, 
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and moral fragmentation. Orpah is unthoughtful insofar as 
she has not considered holistically the ramifications of 
her decision. 
Orpah1s purpose in the story seems to be mainly to show 
the significant contrast between her character and that of 
Ruth. Ruth's decision to follow Naomi is an unusual one 
in its apparent selflessness. On the surface Ruth has noth­
ing to gain. Actually, there is compelling logic to support 
the contention that Ruth has the healthiest concept of self 
presented in the story. She has a deep sense of compassion 
based on her relationship to the Ultimate, to others in com­
munity, to self and to the natural world. Her orientation 
to life is spiritual; she does not neglect, the moral and 
political duty that goes with it. 
Matthew Fox (1979), in A Spirituality Named Compassion, 
writes about compassion as a holistic concept, one which 
promotes the survival of the world and recognizes the inter­
dependence of all living things as part of the created God-
world. In Chapter I, Fox (1979) attempts to define com­
passion: 
Compassion is not pity but celebration; compassion is 
not sentiment but is making justice and doing works 
of mercy; compassion is not private, egorcentric or 
narcissistic but public; compassion is not mere human 
personalism but is cosmic in its scope and divine in 
its energies; compassion is not about ascetic detach­
ments or abstract contemplation but is passionate and 
caring; compassion is not anti-intellectual but seeks 
to know and to understand the inter-connections of all 
things; compassion is not religion but a way of life, 
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i.e., a spirituality; compassion is not a moral com­
mandment but a flow and overflow of the fullest human 
and divine energies; compassion is not altruism, but 
self-love and other-love at one. (pp. 32-33) 
Certainly Ruth's actions can be understood in this 
context; she seems to know from her depths that "compassion 
is the fullest experience of the spiritual life" (Fox, 1979, 
p. 33). And in Ruth's famous declaration of allegiances 
we can see the spiritual source and political results of 
her compassion: 
"Entreat me not to leave you or to return from follow­
ing you; for where you go I will go, and where you 
lodge I will lodge; your people shall be my people, 
and your God my God; where you die I will die, and there 
will I be buried. May the Lord do so to me and more 
also if even death parts me from you." (Ruth 1:16-18) 
Indeed Ruth knows that she has no choice but to follow her 
own spirituality as it plays itself out in compassion for 
Naomi and for the world at large. But Ruth's compassion 
is not for Naomi alone; it is for herself also. She knows 
that her own self-love, again based on spirituality, will 
not allow her to make another decision. In fact, if she 
does not show her compassion for Naomi, she can have no life 
of her own worthy of respect.. In consequence, she is com­
pelled to bid Naomi to cease asking her to do what she cannot 
do. To make a choice other than the one to follow Naomi 
would be to violate her conception of the universe, the 
created world, as a hallowed and spiritual space. She demon­
strates fully Fox's (1979) claim: 
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To be compassionate is to incorporate one's own fullest 
energies with cosmic ones into the twin tasks of 
1) relieving the pain of fellow creatures by way of 
justice-making, and 2) celebrating the existence, time 
and space that all creatures share as a gift from the 
only One who is the universe's Maker; it is the action 
we take because of that kinship. No wonder Meister 
Eckhart . . . could declare as he did: "You may call 
God love; you may call God goodness; but the best name 
for God is Compassion." 
(p. 34)) 
Ruth's compassion goes beyond goodness and lays claim to 
all that is holy--to the spirituality of justice and preser­
vation of the created world. 
Ruth's choice of compassion is played out partially in 
female friendship. Janice G. Raymond (1986), in A Passion 
for Friends: Toward a Philosophy of Female Affection, 
writes about the need for a theory and practice of female 
friendship. Raymond proposes that "women who do not love 
their Selves cannot love others like their Selves" (p. 4). 
Ruth is in a sense the "rare woman" that Raymond describes 
in her book: 
A tribute to the original woman—the woman who searches 
for and claims her relational origins with her vital 
Self and with other vital women. . . . She is not "the 
other" of de Beauvoir's Second Sex who is man-made. 
. . . And she does not deny her friendship . . . for 
other women. She is her Self. She is an original 
woman, who belongs to her Self, who is neither copied, 
reproduced, nor translated from man's image of her. 
She is, in the now obsolete meaning of the original, 
a rare [solitary] woman. (p. 5) 
Raymond says further that "friendship begins with the 
affinity a woman has with her vital Self" and asserts that 
a "woman's Self is her original and most enduring friend" 
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and that "female friendship begins with the companionship 
of the Self" (pp. 5-6) . The text of the story of Ruth seems 
to bear witness to the observation that Ruth's friendship 
with Naomi is rooted in a deep sense of Self—especially 
as it is defined in this dissertation: as action deeply 
rooted in spiritual connection. Ruth, then, is not acting 
out of misplaced sense of duty and loss of self but out of 
a deeply rooted understanding of her own Self as it is itself 
spi ri tua1. 
A corollary to spirituality, one which plays itself 
out in compassionate friendship, is thought-fulness. Like 
Maxine Greene's definition of "wide-awakeness"—that is a 
thoughtfulness and full awareness of the world, the choices 
available and the consequences of those choices—is Raymond's 
description of thoughtfulness. Concerned with a theory and 
practice of female friendship, Raymond (1986) writes: 
The kind of theory I have been advocating ... is a 
thoughtful theory—one that restores the thought-fulness 
to thinking. Or, better still, thinking is the theory; 
thoughtfulness is the practice. (p. 218) 
I believe Ruth has thought the situation out within the 
context of her spirituality and that she is "wide-awake" 
about the choices that she has made. Indeed, throughout 
the story we become aware of her as a character who is "full 
of thought," "absorbed in thought," "meditative," and "char­
acterized by careful reasoned thinking [emphasis added]" 
(Raymond, 1986, p. 218). Raymond adds that 
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A vision of female friendship restores the thinking 
to thoughtfulness. At the same time, it restores a 
thoughtfulness to thinking, that is, a respect and con-
siderateness for another's needs. Only thoughtfulness, 
in its more expanded meaning, can sustain female friend­
ship and give it daily life. A thinkin g friendship 
must become a thoughtful friendship in the full sense 
of the word thoughtfulness. (pp. 220-221) 
Ruth appears to have acted positively and with thoughtful­
ness within the mythic context of the spiritual and moral/ 
political choices presented here. Her choices are not 
thoughtless ones; they have been carefully weighed within 
the context of her life in this social situation to this 
poi nt.. 
Of the three women featured in the book of Ruth, Ruth 
stands out as the one who is spiritually unique. Though 
she too has suffered the loss of a husband and is facing 
the loss of her homeland and family, her response is quali­
tatively different from the responses of the others who are 
here called into action. As an obedient woman Orpah returns 
home, respected by Naomi as a good person. Experiencing 
deep grief, depression, and bitterness, Naomi returns to 
her homeland in silence. Ruth alone acts responsibly and 
compassionately and in keeping with her spirituality. For 
this she gets no immediate reward and indeed seems to expect 
none. The action itself appears to be the reward. 
The Journey: The Trials 
Of the three female characters here presented, Ruth 
reminds us the most of Campbell's (1968) composite hero. 
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Ruth is the one who is set up as the bearer of spirituality 
to the world—consequently as the one who can be called hero. 
She is the catalyst who has been set in motion to mend the 
broken spirituality of the wor-ld of Naomi and the others 
she meets. 
At first glance Ruth's actions seem to have been con­
cocted to employ traditionally female wiles to fulfill the 
political, social, and emotional needs of Naomi and herself. 
After all, she deliberately places herself in sight of Boaz, 
the distant kinsman of Naomi and possible fulfiller of lev-
irate law (since there is no one else directly in line to 
do so), and as she comes to him on the threshing room floor 
at night she asks him to marry her. 
But a second look reveals something quite different. 
Ruth seems to have made a conscious and very thoughtful 
deci si on to survive as well as she possibly can while caring 
for Naomi within a social structure from which her own needs 
are excluded. She appears to be approaching the world with 
"wide-awakeness" and 11 thoughtfulness." She knows the social 
situation and works hard at remaining spiritually rooted; 
all the while she provides for the survival needs of her 
chosen "family." After all, she has come this far by seeking 
to keep justice and mercy and compassion in the world. It 
would be out of character for her to make other choices at 
this point, though she is well aware of the nature of those 
other options for her life. 
112 
Ruth has made a conscious decision to act within the 
social structure rather than outside it. But it would be 
wrong to conclude that Ruth considers herself to be of it. 
Her choices for living her life as a part of the existing 
social structure would include choosing to act in like man­
ner to Naomi or to Orpah and she rejects these choices. 
Ruth, instead, values her "foreignness" (Gunn, 1984) because 
its marginality provides her with freer choices. (See also 
Freire, 1970: Giroux, 1981, 1983, 1987.) Being rooted in 
Self, she chooses thoughtfully to act for justice in full 
consideration of the ramifications of doing so in this society. 
Ruth works on the edge of society, carrying out her plan 
for wholeness. This method of bringing about change was 
endorsed in a recent lecture by Rosemary Radford Ruether 
(1987a), a theologian who advocates the use of existing insti­
tutions (like the church) by women who would like to see 
those institutions respond to the world in more humanizing 
and community-based ways. In contrast to theologian Mary 
Daly (1985), who found that she had to separate herself from 
the church because she could no longer tolerate its patri­
archal structure, Ruether (1987a) feels that the views of 
women cannot be ignored if they stay within patriarchal 
institutions, working on the "outside edges" and attempting 
to recenter the institution (here the church) to work in 
humanizing and healing ways. Ruether feels that if women 
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truly want the world to be more humane, then they cannot 
separate themselves from other persons or from the institu­
tions that they find objectionable. Further, she feels that 
it is by working on the edges that women nudge others into 
perceiving the need for spiritual healing. Ruth appears 
to exercise some of the same vision in order to bring com­
passion and justice to her world and to bring about a con­
sciousness of what the roles of others are to be in this 
humanizing process. 
Essentially Ruth must overcome three major trials in 
her hero-journey for survival in this patriarchal society: 
she must find food, she must find a levir (a male protector 
as son or husband), and she must find a way of creating off­
spring. As the dominant force attempting to bring the frui­
tion of spirituality to each trial, Ruth—who has no real 
power within the social structure—still acts responsibly 
and with knowledge of what her actions may mean. Accepting 
that Ruth acts with knowledge, we can probably assume that 
she knows the character of both of Naomi's existing male 
relatives and that she has chosen to make herself known to 
Boaz primarily because he is the most likely to respond to 
her. 
Boaz, "a kinsman of her [Naomi's] husband's, a mighty 
man of wealth, of the family of Elimelech" (Ruth 2:1), treats 
the Moabitess Ruth with gentleness and respect and protects 
her from molestation (Ruth 2:8) while she gleans as the poor 
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do in the fields, taking what is left behind. It is appar­
ent that he is a man of unusual character and most likely 
of character that is a match for Ruth's. When Boaz is told 
by his foreman that Ruth is the Moabite maiden who came with 
Naomi, Boaz treats her with extreme kindness, seeming to 
ignore her race and the fact that she is without privilege 
in his society. He says: 
"Now, listen, my daughter, do not go to glean in 
another field or leave this one, but keep close to my 
maidens. Let your eyes be upon the field which they 
are reaping, and go after them. Have I not charged 
the young men not to molest, you? And when you are 
thirsty, go to the vessels and drink what the young 
men have drawn" [emphasis added]. (Ruth 2:8-9) 
This unusual kindness, suggesting familial relationship 
("my daughter"), is, of course, emphasized by Ruth in her 
conversation. She knows he is the key to her survival: 
"Why have l_ found favor in your eyes, that you should take 
notice of me, when I am a foreigner?" [emphasis added] 
(Ruth 2:10). Boaz's response shows that he, too, is one who 
knows reputations and reads character, for he adds: 
"All that you have done for your mother-in-law since 
the death of your husband has been fully told me, and 
how you left your father and mother and your native land 
and came to a people that you did not know before." 
(Ruth 2:11) 
Boaz's generosity, which apparently comes from a sense of 
spiritual connection on hjs own part, is enhanced when he 
willingly blesses her: "The Lord recompense you for what 
you have done, and a full reward be given you by the Lord, 
the God of Israel, under whose wings you have come to take 
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refuge 1" (Ruth 2:13). Boaz, who appears to have been nur­
tured by Ruth, then adds to his blessing by providing for 
her at mealtime and instructing his workers to be generous 
in leaving sheaves behind for Ruth. 
Before the day is over, Ruth has another opportunity 
to remind Boaz to think about her relation to him and says, 
"You have spoken kindly to your maidservant, though I am 
not one of your maidservants" (Ruth 2:13). Ruth continually 
reminds Boaz of his relationship with her in such a way that 
he has to consider what that relationship really is. With 
such action she is taking control of her own life and work­
ing within the social structure, but yet on the edge of it, 
to bring about the viable fulfillment of her needs. 
In these passages Ruth not only acquires the necessary 
food for herself and for Naomi, but she also has thought­
fully set into motion the plan for resolving her next trial— 
to acquire a levir to care for herself and Naomi. After 
gleaning in the fields for many days and being allowed to 
assume a place of privilege, Ruth—with the advice of Naomi, 
who seems finally to be coming out of her depression—stages 
a bold adventure: she appraoches Boaz in the night, remind­
ing him that he is the next of kin and as such as a duty 
to provide for Naomi and for her. Remaining true to his 
character, Boaz again compliments Ruth by saying: "You have 
made this last kindness greater than the first, in that you 
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have not gone after young men, whether poor or rich" 
(Ruth 3:10). Pointing out her fine reputation, Boaz adds: 
"All my fellow townsmen know that you are a woman of worth" 
(Ruth 3:11) and then he promises to "do the part of the next 
of kin" (Ruth 3:13). The next morning Boaz goes, as promised, 
to the gates of the city and challenges the other relation, 
who we discover is actually closer in kin than Boaz, to buy 
Naomi's land and marry Ruth (Ruth 4:1-6). When this closest 
relation refuses the marriage out of fear of impairing his 
own inheritance, Boaz marries Ruth, at a stroke providing 
her with the levir she and Naomi so desperately need. 
Throughout this very risky business of appearing to Boaz 
at night, Ruth had to depend on the probability that Boaz 
would continue to be true to his character. And—as we would 
expect by this time—Boaz remains true to his own conception 
of the moral ramifications of his spirituality by saying: 
"Let it not be known that the woman came to the threshing 
floor" (Ruth 3:14). Thus he protects her reputation, which 
he has so often referred to in the story. In addition, he 
again provides food for her to take back to Naomi and thus 
acknowledges his good intentions. While this discussion 
focuses on the women in the story, it should be noted that 
Boaz is a rich character in his own right and deserves, at 
another time, his own fuller interpretation. 
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The Return: The Hero Spirit-Deed 
i 
One trial remains: to provide an offspring for Naomi. 
With the marriage of Boaz and Ruth, this provision becomes 
a possibility. When Boaz makes the legal arrangements at 
the gates, he, having also come into fuller spirituality 
through Ruth, announces the status of Ruth: 
"Also Ruth the Moabitess, the widow of Mahlon, I have 
bought to be my wife, to perpetuate the name of the 
dead in his inheritance, that the name of the dead may 
not be cut off from among his brethren and from the 
gate of his native place; you are witnesses this day." 
(Ruth 4:10) 
Shortly a son is born, whose arrival assures Naomi that she 
will not be left without next of kin (Ruth 4:14). The sig­
nificance of this child is expressed in this way: "He shall 
be to you a restorer of life and a nourisher of your old 
age" (Ruth 4:15). As a "restorer of life" in this patri­
archal society, the child becomes symbolic of wholeness to 
Naomi, who clings to the patriarchal order of relationships. 
Indeed we are led to believe that Naomi never quite grasps 
the true worth of Ruth in her life, for it is the women of 
the town, not Naomi, who in the end properly describe Ruth: 
"Your daughter-in-law who loves you, who is more to you than 
seven sons, has borne him" [emphasis added] (Ruth 4:15). 
Ruth has acted courageously and even heroically in this 
story to restore the spiritual foundation to her shattered 
family. In doing so she restores life to an elderly, grieving 
woman who sees no future for herself or her family. In 
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addition she appears to enhance the life of Boaz, a man of 
the town who is most likely the spiritual counterpart for 
her. Clearly he is a man of unusual insight, for he treats 
Ruth—a foreigner—with the utmost gentleness, generosity, 
and respect, and, in addition, he recognizes the need for— 
and willingly participates in--the restoration of Naomi's 
family. Ruth's actions are remarked with amazement by the 
townspeople, who from the beginning comment, on the strength 
of her unusual friendship for Naomi and recognize the nature 
of her sacrifices in order to care for this woman. Because 
the townspeople's descriptions of Ruth appear to be strate­
gically placed throughout the narrative, we cannot help but 
infer that Ruth has somehow spiritually transformed their 
lives too. At any rate, though a foreigner, she has 
attracted their attention to her character. Based on an 
understanding of her own spirituality, then, Ruth has chosen 
to act morally to care for those around her, but also, through 
her life, to call others into acceptance of their own moral 
and political duty. Highly respected, a woman of worth, 
Ruth, centered spiritually, has worked on the edge of society 
to bring about the spiritual and political results which 
are called for in this extreme situation. Ruth is not mar­
ginal to God. Ruth has, in the words of Rosemary Ruether 
(1987b), "neither worked within the system as it is" nor 
regarded herself as "disenfranchised." She has been enabled 
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to work from this healthy perspective to solve this crucial 
problem precisely because she understands her own spirit­
uality and the political and moral ramifications of that 
spi ri tuali ty. 
Myth as Metaphor for Ultimate Concern 
The story of Ruth, when examined critically to get at 
its archetypal images, reveals a narrative of mythic propor­
tions. Its focus is on the spiritual and political founda­
tions of the life of a hero who finds that she is compelled 
to act to restore wholeness to the world. Ruth's story 
outlines the heroic journey of a woman who has chosen to 
base her moral and political decisions on an understanding 
of spiritual connections. And the actions she chooses are 
highly unusual ones for her time, which is pointed up by 
the choices of Orpah and Naomi, the other two women of the 
story. While on the surface Ruth appears to adhere to a 
typically female malaise centered in selflessness, a closer 
look at the story reveals a woman who has developed a healthy 
self-identity out of her spirituality. She is thus not 
alienated from self but rather psychically integrated in 
holistic ways. Ruth has not chosen the easiest way to live, 
as Orpah did; nor has she chosen a destructive and self-
pitying way, as Naomi did. Rather she has chosen the most 
fulfilling and hopeful way that she can envision to bring 
holistic living and even survival back to her world. 
Ruth can be described as a female counterpart to Camp­
bell's (1968) male hero in The Hero with a Thousand Faces. 
Ruth fits Campbell's hero composite in that she leaves home, 
encounters ordeals which she eventually conquers, and emerges 
as the provider of a boon which restores the world. 
Her journey is qualitatively different from the journey 
of the male hero described by Campbell, however. This dif­
ference centers primarily in the different perceptions of 
spirituality held by Ruth and the composite hero. While 
the male hero learns about and develops his spirituality 
after leaving home and during the trials of the journey, 
Ruth leaves home because of her spirituality to develop a 
keener sense of the moral and political forces in her life. 
Since her spirituality is characterized by connections of 
ultimate and inseparable importance, Ruth is compelled to 
uphold these essential relationships in her decisions about 
how to live her life. It is interesting to note here that 
Ruth seems to know that her future is not with her parents; 
at the time of the journey her maturity has outstripped that 
stage of development. By contrast, the male hero is gen­
erally forced to leave home in search of the spiritual under­
standing he needs for the journey, which in turn defines 
his maturity and allows his return as a changed person. 
Ruth's separation in leaving home is already centered in 
a connectedness to others, to herself, to the Ultimate and 
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to the natural world, while the male hero appears to leave 
home in search of such an understanding. 
The purpose for the journeys, then, is also different. 
Building on this differing sense of spirituality, Ruth jour­
neys for a different reason than the Campbell hero does. 
Ruth's voyage is based on a spiritual connection that compels 
her to care for the day-to-day welfare of other people. 
In the story she must decide how she and Naomi are to survive 
in a patriarchal society that provides neither food nor shel­
ter for widowed women who cannot meet certain criteria. 
Her actions are based on a thoughtful consideration of her 
spirituality and how it can play itself out in a society 
unwilling to provide for her. The male hero, on the other 
hand, generally faces ordeals which force him to call upon 
"strangely intimate forces" (Campbell, 1968, p. 245) to help 
him in his combative, personal trials of life and death. 
Though the male hero may have someone to fight alongside 
him, his primary interest is still self-survival. While Ruth 
bases her spirituality on sacred connections, the male hero 
bases his spirituality on primordial events of a cosmic 
nature, including death, birth, and rebirth cycles patterned 
after the great gods. 
The third aspect of the hero life that differs for Ruth 
and the composite hero is the return with the boon that 
restores the world. Ruth's journey obviously cannot be seen 
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as a return; she has found a new home in Bethlehem. While 
in most narratives the hero returns as a new and decidedly 
changed person, having learned from the journey what his 
adult role is to be, Ruth is as a result of her journey 
likely only wiser and more skilled than formerly in how to 
survive politically in an unfriendly world. While the male 
hero may return with a material boon, frequently one stolen 
from him and now restored, or even with just the new skill 
of leadership—itself recognized as a boon, Ruth's boon is 
one she has herself helped to create in the form of the new 
child: the restorer of Naomi's family. Though Ruth's repu­
tation is far-reaching, in reality she restores only a small 
"world"--one family. On the other hand, the male hero 
restores with his boon a much larger world in the shape of 
a tribe or nation. It is generally at this point that the 
political and moral duties of the male hero begin. So while 
there are similar stages in the stories of Ruth and the Camp­
bell composite hero, their stories are qualitatively differ­
ent primarily because their understandings of spirituality 
are at variance. 
For Ruth the matters of ultimate concern are her spir­
itual connections to the natural world (she gleans in the 
fields, births babies), to herself (she has an understand­
ing of her own spirituality that she adheres to), to others 
(she feels compelled to follow Naomi to care for the mother-
in-law when she has no outside duty to do so), and to the 
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Ultimate (she declares Naomi's god to be her god and shows 
a spirituality that recognizes the created order as impor­
tant) . Ruth also faces the extreme concerns which the patri­
archal system creates for her—those regarding food and shel­
ter and an offspring for a woman of the patriarchal order 
who worries about the perpetuation of her family. In 
essence Ruth has got to worry about her physical survival 
in a world where, because of her status as a foreigner, she 
can be molested as she gathers the grains left behind in 
the fields. But Ruth's primary concern is how to be true 
to her own spiritual nature while she solves the political 
problems presented to her. How can she, in an unfair situa­
tion, respond morally? Very like the man in Bellah et al. 
(1985), then, Ruth is deeply concerned about family and those 
other aspects of life to which she is connected. It seems 
highly unlikely that she would respond otherwise, if asked— 
especially considering her actions. 
Despite what I might anticipate concerning Ruth's own 
repsonses to her concerns, other significant matters reveal 
themselves in the story. When we consider myth as the meta­
phor which shows both what is and what is not there, the 
"what is not there" must also be examined. The main feature 
of Ruth's life that is not there is true political power. 
Ruth has to work through the male structure to create a sit­
uation that will care for her and Naomi. She cannot go to 
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the gate and work out her own destiny. She cannot buy and 
sell the land, even though it is owned by a dead father-in-
law. She herself must be bargained for. She is not even 
powerful enough to give herself to whomever she wants in mar­
riage or to choose to live on her own or to live with another 
compatible family. So what is not there is the political 
and social power needed to fully determine her own life. 
But there is a sense that Ruth is empowered by her spiritual­
ity and her intellect, for she works very keenly on the edge 
of the social structure to determine her own future and to 
bring others into their own spiritual wholeness as it relates 
to political and moral action. 
One of the attractive mythic qualities of the text of 
the story of Ruth is that it is rich enough to provide another 
interpretation of Ruth's role in the story--one of prophet 
(Brueggemann, 1982) or "foreigner and therefore a transla­
tor . . . [of the] political" as it relates to universal 
wholeness (Gunn, 1984). A fuller discussion of the impor­
tance of the prophetic role for education is provided in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CANON OF MYTH AND EDUCATION 
While there are several dimensions to the importance 
of myth for educational discourse, the concern that seems 
to contribute most significantly to the stated concerns of 
this paper is one which focuses on the canon of myth as 
revealed in the exegesis of the story of Ruth in Chapter IV. 
As a heuristic, the story of Ruth revealed the workings of 
myth as spiritual and political integration. For Ruth and 
those with whom she comes into contact, this mythic frame­
work—especially as a politics of spirituality—played a 
significant role in decisions about how to live their lives 
and about how richly rewarding those lives would be. 
In The Creative Word: Canon as a Model for Biblical 
Education, Walter Brueggemann (1982) suggests that there 
is an important correlation between the educational function 
of the church and the process of canon construction. And 
it is my own contention that this correlation has implica­
tions for a study like this of myth and education. In 
stressing the importance of education for the perpetuation 
of society, Brueggemann writes: 
Every community that wants to last beyond a single 
generation must concern itself with education. Educa­
tion has to do with the maintenance of a community 
through the generations. This maintenance must assure 
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enough continuity of vision, value, and perception so 
that the community sustains its self-identity. At the 
same time, such maintenance must assure enough freedom 
and novelty so that the community can survive in and 
be pertinent to new circumstnces. Thus, education must 
attend both to processes of continuity and discontinu­
ity in order to avoid fossilizing into irrelevance on 
the one hand, and relativizing into disappearance on 
the other hand. (p. 1) 
According to Brueggemann, our education must attend to old 
orders of thinking, as well as to the characteristics of 
alienation caused by technology, and other alienating phenomena, 
in order to keep us alive. 
Brueggemann (1982) claims that it is necessary for the 
literary process of canon and the process of socialization 
to be examined in relation to one another if education is 
to be viable (p. 120). The hermeneutic process of "engaging 
the text in subtle ways as the live Word of God . . . can 
give vitality to the community" and this process can permit 
the text "to continue to have vitality, authority, and rele­
vance for new generations in new circumstances" (pv 6). 
Brueggemann1s starting point, then, is that "the process 
of canon is a main clue to education" (pp. 5-6). According 
to Brueggemann canon is both the written text and any 
response to that text which comes out of a faith in God. 
The phenomenon that Brueggemann is referring to, then, is the 
response to life in this particular community of faith. 
The response that Brueggemann writes about is similar 
to what other writers propose when they mention the necessity 
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of telling one's story in order to name the world and in 
order later to have a text to which to respond for the pur­
poses of discovering and critiquing the goodness of our 
places in the world. One writer who calls for such a tell­
ing and retelling is Carol P. Christ (1980) who, in writing 
for women specifically, says that women need to hear their 
stories in order to affirm their spiritual and social places 
in the world and in order to create new visions of a more 
holistic world (pp. 39, 127). Another writer asserts: 
Consciousness-raising, or "conscientization"—what I 
have called the entry point of a liberation theological 
process—happens when collective storytelling, a pro­
cess of naming with others our shared situation, gets 
under way. Conscientization involves recognition that 
what we have experienced, in isolation and silence, 
as private pain is in fact a public, structural dynamic. 
My life is now perceived in a new way in light of your 
stories. Together we slowly re-vision our reality so 
that what appeared, originally, to be an individual 
or personalized "problem" or even a human "failing," 
is exposed as a basic systemic pattern of injustice. 
The reality of oppression, exploitation, or subjugation 
becomes clear as we "learn together" to grasp the common 
meaning of our lives. Until each participant in the 
process of reflection has been empowered to break 
silence and name her or his own story, the pedagogy 
of liberation is violated. (Harrison, 1985, p. 243) 
Telling our own stories, then, has strong implications for 
personal wholeness, social justice, and awareness of the 
power of community. 
Still another writer who has stressed the importance of 
story for the alleviation of misfortune in the modern context 
is Elie Wiesel (1966), who writes: 
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When the great Rabbi Israel Baal Shem-Tov saw mis­
fortune threatening the Jews it was his custom to go 
into a certain part of the forest to meditate. There 
he would light a fire, say a special prayer, and the 
miracle would be accomplished and the misfortune 
averted. Later, when his disciple, the celebrated Magid 
of Mezritch, had occasion, for the same reason, to 
intercede with heaven, he would go to the same place in 
the forest and say: "Master of the Universe, listen! 
- I do not know how to light the fire, but I am still 
able to say the prayer," and again the miracle would 
be accomplished. Still later, Rabbi Moshe-Leib of 
Sasov, in order to save his people once more, would go 
into the forest and say: "I do not know how to light 
the fire, I do not know the prayer, but I know the place 
and this must be sufficient." It was sufficient and 
the miracle was accomplished. Then it fell to Rabbi 
Israel of Rizhyn to overcome misfortune. Sitting in 
his armchair, his head in his hands, he spoke to God: 
"I am unable to light the fire and I do not know the 
prayer; I cannot even find the place in the forest. All 
I can do is to tell the story, and this must be suffi­
cient." And it was sufficient. 
God made man because he loves stories. (In Keen, 
1978, pp. 82-83) 
The power of story and myth has not been more pointedly 
told than here. 
Similarly Brueggemann considers the canonical process 
to be one of confession and theology engaged in only "by 
those for whom everything is at stake" [emphasis added] and 
he (1982) writes: 
It follows that the educational process, faithfully 
carried out, can be performed only by those who submit 
to the canonical process. Everything is at stake for 
them in the educational process because that process 
is intimately linked to the canonical process, where 
everything is likewise at stake. . . . Canon has to do 
with life. (p. 7) 
For Brueggemann the canonical process is both a reading of 
a text and the interpretation of that text as it carries 
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itself out in our expressions and critiques of living. And 
this life that Brueggemann mentions is described in the 
terms of the Hebrew understanding of it: "Not only is pri­
vate experience not adequate for life, it is a deception 
to speak of private experience; for all human experience 
is deeply social" (p. 25). It is through turning inward, 
according to Brueggemann, that Israel finds solidarity and 
consensus. This inward turning comes of obedience, and memory 
of oppression and of liberation, but it is through it that 
the oppressed, for instance the widows and orphans of the 
society, are cared for (p. 39). And so it is also deeply 
soci al. 
In his discussion of participation in canonical process 
Brueggemann comments on the importance of the prophet—her 
or his actions and her or his voice. Through this discussion 
of the prophet Brueggemann provides another perspective for 
further discussion of myth and education. Brueggemann sees 
the role of the prophet in the canonical process as offering 
"a radical, disruptive act or statement which supersedes 
the old order . . . and . . . truth as 'interruption in the 
continuity of life1" (p. 45). Applied to education, the 
implication of such a position is that we consider the fail­
ure of the old truth and the "surprise and authority of new, 
disruptive words" (p. 46). The prophet becomes in this 
process a kind of leader—a person who calls others into 
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seeing the truth if they have not already seen it for them­
selves. 
One additional characteristic of the prophet is that 
she or he had spiritual power, the foundation of which was 
not in the culture but in a relationship with God. Bruegge-
mann proposes that education should nurture people into 
accepting an alternative imagination, one "which never quite 
perceives the world the way the dominant reality wants us 
to see it" (p. 47). In other words, one of the roles of 
education should be to lead us out of ourselves and into 
critical examination of the existing world: into imagina­
tions of a culture--in arelationship with God--that is both 
different and better than expected. The prophet's role fits 
this leadership role. 
The two further requisites of this canon are first 
that the prophet exist in affinity between the "word of 
Yahweh and the community of the marginal ones in which the 
prophet lives and from which he/she speaks" (p. 50) and also 
that the speech be poetic speech. This gives the prophets 
the "capacity to draw new pictures, form new metaphors, and 
run bold risks of rhetoric" (p. 52), all of which can edu­
cate Israel's imagination. Setting the poetic speech in 
contrast to the speech of the "king," Brueggemann (1982) 
articulates the dangers of losing the prophetic voice this 
way: 
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The educational task of the community is to nurture 
some to prophetic speech. But for many others, it is 
to nurture an awareness that we must permit and welcome 
and evoke that prophetic tongue among us. Otherwise 
we will be diminished into the prose world of the king 
and, finally, without hope. Where there is no tongue 
for new truth, we are consigned to the coldness of the 
old truth. (p. 54) 
A part of education is to nurture people to watch patiently 
and to examine carefully, to guard against the reification 
of social truth. 
But what does all of this have to do with teaching? 
Brueggemann makes several claims here. Primarily teaching 
focuses on the experience of daily life as understood and 
shaped by the community. It is primarily here that the 
importance of telling stories figures. Assuming that educa­
tion takes place in community, Brueggemann asserts that both 
educational parties are engaged in "thoughtful discernment" 
and proceed with a playfulness provocative of the notion 
that knowing is provisional. Brueggemann characterizes pro­
visionally as "a good thing" (pp. 80-81). Brueggemann also 
writes about the importance of education as language that 
teaches wisdom (pp. 89, 93). 
Certainly Brueggemann1s description of the intercon-
nectedness of canon and education is essential to determin­
ing the educational role of mythic canon revealed in Ruth. 
While we have seen that Ruth has heroic qualities spirit­
ually and qualitatively different from the Campbell hero's, 
and that as a function of her heroic qualities she helped 
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restore the world, it is probably of even greater signif­
icance that she can be seen as a prophet who educates others 
about their proper ways to respond to living within the com­
munity and the world around them. Ruth is dutiful to God and 
states emphatically that her spiritual connections come from 
this relationship with the Ultimate. She is quite aware tha.t 
this relationship calls for treating others responsibly. She 
is still marginal to the degree that she lives as a foreigner 
and a poor woman in a marginal community; she is still 
oppressed. She is the type of person Cox (1984), Giroux 
(1983), Brueggemann (1982), and Freire (1970) describe as 
a possible catalyst for social change. As a marginal person, 
then, or even as a displaced person (Gunn, 1984), Ruth has 
enough distance from the society that she is not of it, but 
rather living in it, acting to bring about more humane ways 
of living. 
The prophetic voice of persons of marginality—accord­
ing to Brueggemann and others (Cox, 1984; Freire, 1970; 
Giroux, 1983; Gunn, 1984)--is an educative voice. Education 
in this context calls people into action on behalf of justice 
in the world around them. Education, then, calls for a 
thoughtful and critical consciousness about the world and 
a duty to action on that consciousness. Since, as Bruegge­
mann points out, this consciousness is one of marginality, 
it does not represent the mainstream of social thought. 
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So people must be educated to "hear" differently and to "see" 
differently than the society and culture at large would teach 
them to do. A point Brueggemann does not take up but which 
seems important here is that education usually comes as a 
result of crises which call for decisions about survival. 
The story of Ruth is told in this educative context 
but it is also told in a close educative context of friend­
ship. And just as any story rich in meaning will supply 
both what is and what is not there—a metaphorical quality 
in its myt.hos--the story of Ruth reveals that just because 
Ruth befriends Naomi--and in a sense acts as prophet for 
her--it does not follow that Naomi can "hear" or "see" the 
importance of Ruth as prophet or as educator. There seems 
to be an implication here that the prophetic responsibility 
goes even further than that suggested by Brueggemann: so 
that while Ruth can call some, like Boaz, into action, she 
has to accept responsibility for others who cannot respond 
for themselves. McFague (1982) offers the metaphor of God 
as friend and Ruth seems here to be playing that role. I 
suggest that it is through friendship that Brueggemann's 
widows are cared for: it may be difficult for many who have 
been schooled in the social ways—without the tools of 
critique---to see any way of acting politically in their own 
behalf. 
In addition to the importance of the prophet and the 
prophetic voice for educational canon, there is another 
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characteristic of canon which correlates with the person 
and actions of the prophet—that is, that the story and the 
language of the prophet are poetic. For the educational 
purposes of determining the canon of myth it is helpful to 
have both a plot and a dialogue to respond to—as well as 
the person of the prophet. Words can be as important as 
actions. Power lies in being able to name one's world 
(Huebner, 1984) and in being able later to rename it. Naming 
implies acting on the new perception. So text for educational 
critique should reveal a person (prophet, hero) who acts 
on the world in significant ways—not in expected ways—and 
who names the world in poetic terms: with poetry considered 
as synonymous with the voice of the new and unexpected. 
The mythic text, then, is metaphorical and teaches new ways 
of perceiving: ways which are not the old—and which will 
not necessarily be the future—ways. 
The educational criticism of a text — the scrutiny of 
a text for spiritual and political qualities of myth— 
produces eisegesis (meaning) and increases one's spiritual 
and political sensibility about the lived world. Textual 
criticism is a prophetic act and one which is more than a 
revelation of the political, to which in Eagleton's (1983) 
view it is always and only limited. It is a revelation not 
only of the political but of the spiritual. Textual criti­
cism can reveal a reverence and connection through its 
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spirituality, and can reveal a widom (which shares a root 
with political), in its politics and duty. 
A good educational text, like the story of Ruth, will 
be metaphorical insofar as it will be rich enough to teach 
what is as well as what is not. And in the context of this 
paper a rich text for education will be both prophetic and 
heroic insofar as it wi1l--through the actions and words 
of the prophet--cal1 people into a new sensibility about 
their lived lives in the world. Furthermore, this new sensi­
bility includes a new understanding of both the spiritual 
connections of life and the political duty such spirituality 
can inspire. Radical texts call for radical interpretations 
and radical responses. In addition the text will also be 
poetic in that it will call persons into new ways of looking 
at the world and into new ways of taking responsibility for 
i t. 
There are such scholars as Ruether (1987a), Rich (1986), 
Daly (1985), and Spretnak (1982), who assert that women are 
prophetic in that their sensibilities affirm the possibil­
ities of annihilation as well as the possibilities for avert­
ing it. Women like Mary Daly (1985), for example, claim 
that they can no longer live in a patriarchal society and 
that women's talk must be primarily for the development of 
women. The recognition that women do operate generally in 
a realm of connections and that women do tend to seek peace 
more ardently than do men is by this time well researched 
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(Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1982). This is not to say 
that the knowledge of connections and of peace is for women 
only or that women are the only persons to hold insight about 
this kind of spirituality. It. is my contention, however, 
that masculine and feminine traits are metaphorical and as 
such can be heuristic in the pursuit of wisdom. Women as 
both oppressed and marginal are particularly open to the 
possibilities of living lives prophetically, imaginatively, 
and hoiistically. 
According to Engelsman (1987), it is through repres­
sion that we create a climate which calls for an even more 
perverse social situation. In the face of their repression 
the prophetic insights of spirituality and moral action that 
are so acutely felt by women at this point in history are 
both situation specific and of more general significance. 
It is then my hope that women's spirituality and moral 
action can be prophetic for everyone, not just for the 
empowerment of women. 
It appears then that the role of the teacher can benefit 
from being seen as a prophetic one, in which the task is to 
call others into reverence about their connections to the 
Ultimate and the past and the present and the future, and to 
call others into the duty of preserving the world in more 
positive and holistic ways for living out their lives in com­
munity. Teachers with the prophetic sensibility must have 
the ability to live on the edge of the culture so that they 
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can approach the world with "wide-awakeness" and call, 
through poetic response to the world, others into action for 
a more just world. 
In essence education must be concerned with the spir­
itual and the political—political critique without the 
spiritual is at best limited and at worst sterile. There 
must be a' grounding in reverence and there must be a duty--
both of which are mythic in quality. If mythic canon process 
shapes our education so that our society can continue, it 
must call us into critical response about our own spiritual­
ity and our own political duty as it is perceived in defer­
ence to the cultural norm. We must exist on the edge, at a 
distance from both ourselves and the society so that we can 
see what our political duty is and so that we can see when 
we are neglecting the reverence-spiritual aspect of our 
lives. We as educators also have a duty to call others into 
this sensibility by teaching in "wide-awakeness" and with 
energy about the world we live in and its connections to 
the past and the future. Without such connections to the 
created natural world, to the society and community, and to 
ourselves, we are assured of death. 
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APPENDIX 
CAMPBELL'S MODEL OF THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE HERO 
Threshold crossing 
Brother-battle 
Dragon-battle 
Dismemberment 
Crucifixion 
Abduction 
Nisht-sea journey 
Wonder journey 
Whale's belly 
Call to^ 
Adventure 
/ 
Helper 
Elixir 
THRESHOLD OF ADVENTURE 
Helpers 
1. SACRED MARRIAGE 
2. FATHER ATONEMENT 
3. APOTHEOSIS 
4. ELIXIR THEFT 
Return 
Resurrection 
Rescue 
Threshold struggle 
Source: Campbell, J. (1968). The Hero with a 
Thousand Faces (2nd ed.)• Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
